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ABSTRACT
Quantum error correcting codes play an essential role in protecting quantum
information from the noise and the decoherence. Most quantum codes have been
constructed based on the Pauli basis indexed by a finite field. With a newly intro-
duced algebraic class called a nice ring, it is possible to construct the quantum codes
such that their alphabet sizes are not restricted to powers of a prime.
Subsystem codes are quantum error correcting schemes unifying stabilizer codes,
decoherence free subspaces and noiseless subsystems. We show a generalization of
subsystem codes over nice rings. Furthermore, we prove that free subsystem codes
over a finite chain ring cannot outperform those over a finite field. We also generalize
entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting codes to nice rings. With the help of
the entanglement, any classical code can be used to derive the corresponding quan-
tum codes, even if such codes are not self-orthogonal. We prove that an R-module
with antisymmetric bicharacter can be decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum of
hyperbolic pairs using symplectic geometry over rings. So, we can find hyperbolic
pairs and commuting generators generating the check matrix of the entanglement-
assisted quantum code.
Fault-tolerant quantum computation has been also studied over a finite field.
Transversal operations are the simplest way to implement fault-tolerant quantum
gates. We derive transversal Clifford operations for CSS codes over nice rings, inclu-
ding Fourier transforms, SUM gates, and phase gates. Since transversal operations
alone cannot provide a computationally universal set of gates, we add fault-tolerant
implementations of doubly-controlled Z gates for triorthogonal stabilizer codes over
nice rings.
ii
Finally, we investigate optimal key exchange protocols for unconditionally secure
key distribution schemes. We prove how many rounds are needed for the key exchange
between any pair of the group on star networks, linear-chain networks, and general
networks.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
Conventional computing systems are usually implemented using VLSI circuits in
silicon technology. The size of silicon-based processing units is getting smaller each
year. But this technology is going to reach its physical limits within the next few
years [1, 2]. So we need to explore alternative technologies. New materials such as
carbon-nano tubes [3] promise faster transistors. Optical processing units [4] promise
higher bandwidths. Thus, the new circuit technologies offer a speed up compared to
silicon-based devices. How large is this speed up going to be? We don’t know yet.
Likely, it is going to be a constant speed up compared to the current silicon-based
technology. Are there other ways to obtain a much faster speed up?
Quantum computation is well known for outperforming conventional computation
for certain problems. In fact, it is able to provide quantum algorithms to solve some
hard problems. A famous example is the integer factorization problem. The classical
computation systems cannot solve this problem in a polynomial time. By contrast,
Shor’s quantum algorithm [5] runs in polynomial time to find the prime factors of an
integer. Another example is Pell’s equation, one of the oldest problems in number
theory. Given a positive nonsquare integer d, Pell’s equation is x2 − dy2 = 1. The
goal is to find the pair (x1, y1) that minimizes x + y
√
d among infinitely many pair
of integers satisfying the equation. Hallgren [6] showed how a quantum computer
can find the solution in polynomial time. We do not yet have any polynomial time
classical algorithm for this problem.
So what gives the quantum computation such powerful computational enhance-
ments? Conventional computation is based on laws of classical mechanics. On the
other hand, quantum computation exploits quantum physics for computation. A
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quantum bit, or shortly a qubit, is a unit to store the information. It has a form of
a superposition of two basis, |0〉 and |1〉. The qubit gives us the information of the
probabilities to observe |0〉 and |1〉.
The problem here is that building quantum information systems is quite hard.
Quantum bits are so vulnerable to interactions with the environment surrounding
them. They tend to yield errors due to decoherence. In other words, coupling with
other quantum states corrupts the quantum information. To protect quantum system
from such errors, we need to use quantum error correcting codes. Quantum error
correcting codes are essential in quantum communication and quantum computation
[7, 8, 9]. They can protect quantum information against noise in a quantum channel.
Also, they can remedy decoherence effects in quantum memory. Quantum codes
encode the physical quantum information in a mathematically-defined way. So, we
could restore the information corrupted during the transmission or the computation.
We can also use quantum error correcting codes for fault-tolerant quantum com-
putation. Suppose that we have a good quantum error correcting code. First, we
encode quantum bits using this quantum code. Then, we perform logical quantum
operations on the encoded quantum bits without decoding. In such a way, we can
compute quantum information without any decoherence issues. It implies that we
could perform quantum computation in a fault-tolerant way.
One way to construct quantum codes is the so-called Calderbank-Shor-Steane
(CSS) code construction [10, 11]. This gives us a systematic way to construct the
quantum code using classical codes. For constructing quantum versions of error
correcting codes, Gottesman introduced the stabilizer formalism [12]. Currently, the
stabilizer formalism is indispensable for the construction of most quantum codes.
Stabilizer codes also allow us to derive quantum codes from classical error correcting
codes. CSS codes are a special subclass of stabilizer codes. Stabilizer codes are
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simultaneous eigenspaces with +1 eigenvalues of all elements in stabilizer group.
One drawback of stabilizer codes is that the corresponding classical codes need to be
self-orthogonal codes.
Quantum error correcting scheme is the key technique for a fault-tolerant quan-
tum computation [7, 9]. Suppose that the level of the error can keep being under a
threshold. Then, we could perform any quantum operations without any concerns
about the errors [13]. One major difficulty here is that the quantum gate could
spread errors to other parts. Those affected parts might be in the same block or in
the other block. To avoid these undesirable events, we need to consider a transversal
operation. The transversal operation is in a simple form because it is a bit-wise
operation. Unfortunately, having only transversal operations are not enough for a
computational universality [14]. So we need an alternative approach to detour this
issue like the one introduced in [15].
A finite field is the dominant algebraic class for constructions of quantum codes.
A famous example of a finite field is a binary. Recently, Klappenecker [16] has intro-
duced a wider algebraic class, a nice nearring. It is well suitable for the generalized
Pauli basis. So we can use this ring to construct the quantum error correcting codes.
A nice nearring has some distinct advantages over a finite field. This wider algebraic
class has no restriction on the order, so it is not limited to powers of primes. Note
that the order of a finite field is a prime power. Besides, a nice nearring can have a
simpler arithmetic. A nice nearring has one special subclass, which is a nice ring. We
have considered to use a nice ring to generalize a couple of quantum error correcting
schemes so far. The first attempt was constructing the stabilizer codes over Frobe-
nius rings [17]. We have put more effort into constructing other quantum schemes
over a nice ring. In this thesis, we develop the theory of subsystem codes over nice
rings [18] and entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting codes over nice rings
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[19]. Also, we investigated fault-tolerant quantum computation over nice rings [20].
Those generalizations are the main results of this thesis. We will show them in the
following chapters.
A fault-tolerant quantum computing system on its own may not be good enough
in a real world. These days, connecting high performance computers with others
offers a strong computing power. We may need to consider a distributed quantum
computing system, too. This can give us more computational power based on the
quantum operations. Moreover, it may ease one of the difficulties, a scaling-up is-
sue. Many researchers have been trying to overcome this issue to build a quantum
machine. Suppose we have some quantum computing systems communicating each
other. One of the key features that we need to set up is a secure key exchange
protocol. There have been a lot of efforts to investigate the secure key exchange
protocols. BB84 is the widespread secure key exchange protocol on the quantum
communication systems [21, 22]. There is also the protocol on the classical commu-
nication systems using Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) [23]. We focus on the
optimal numbers of rounds for the secure key exchange on various networks [24]. In
this thesis, we will give tight bounds for the optimal number of rounds.
This thesis has the following structure. In the next chapter, we provide the
fundamental concepts and the mathematical notations. In Chapter 3, we show the
generalization of the subsystem code over a nice ring. Furthermore, in Chapter
4, we prove the generalization of the entangled-assisted quantum error correcting
code. Then, we discuss how to generalize a fault-tolerant quantum computation
with transversal operations in Chapter 5. Finally, we show the optimal numbers of
rounds for the secure key exchange on three types of networks in Chapter 6. Those
are a star network, a network with a general topology, and a linear-chain network.
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2. PRELIMINARIES
The fundamental concepts and basic notations are discussed in this chapter, so
that the readers would have sufficient background knowledge and be ready to go
through the following chapters without any hassles.
2.1 Nearrings and Rings
First of all, the definition of a nearring is introduced as follows.
A set N under an addition operation + and a multiplication operation · is called
a (left) nearring if it satisfies
1. (N,+) is a (not necessarily abelian) group,
2. (N, ·) is a semigroup,
3. and the left-distributive law x(y + z) = xy + xz holds for all x, y, z ∈ N .
Its subclass, a ring, has the following definition.
A set R under an addition operation + and a multiplication operation · is called
a ring if it satisfies
1. (R,+) is an abelian group,
2. (R, ·) is a monoid,
3. and the distributive laws on both sides, x(y + z) = xy + xz and (y + z)x =
yx+ zx, hold for all x, y, z ∈ R.
A nearring and a ring have fewer constraints than a finite field, so some nearrings
and rings offer an arithmetic that is simpler to implement than finite field arithmetic.
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2.2 Qudits
The qudits are the generalization of the qubits for the higher dimensions. Let R
be a finite ring with q elements. We fix an orthonormal basis B of Cq and denote it
by
B = {|x〉|x ∈ R}.
A quantum state |ψ〉 is denoted by a superposition of the orthonormal basis,
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈R
cx|x〉,
where cx ∈ C for all x ∈ R and
∑
x∈R |cx|2 = 1. The absolute square |cx|2 is the
probability to observe |x〉 when measuring |ψ〉B in the computational basis B.
The qubit is an example of the qudit since F2 is a finite field, so a ring.
Example 1. A qubit has an orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉} of C2. A quantum state
|ψ〉 = c0|0〉+ c1|1〉, where c0, c1 ∈ C and |c0|2 + |c1|2 = 1.
A ring of integer modulo n, where n is an integer, is a good example for the qudit.
Example 2. Let R be the ring of integer modulo 6, denoted Z/6Z. Then, an ort-
honormal basis of C6 is given by {|0〉, |1〉, |2〉, |3〉, |4〉, |5〉}. A quantum state |ψ〉 is of
the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈Z/6Z
cx|x〉,
where cx ∈ C for all x ∈ Z/6Z and
∑
x∈Z/6Z |cx|2 = 1.
2.3 Nice Nearrings and Nice Rings
In this section, we provide fundamental information about nice nearrings and
their properties, see [16] for more details.
6
Let N be a nearring with q elements, where 2 ≤ q <∞. We denote by
{|x〉|x ∈ N}
a fixed orthonormal basis of Cq. Let χ be a character of (N,+). For all a, b ∈ N , we
define a shift operator X(a) : Cq → Cq and a multiplication operator Z(b) : Cq → Cq
by
X(a)|x〉 = |x+ a〉, Z(b)|x〉 = χ(bx)|x〉,
for all x ∈ N .
A finite nearring is called nice if and only if there exists a character χ of (N,+)
such that E = {X(a)Z(b)|a, b ∈ N} is a nice error basis. The set E is called a nice
error basis if and only if it contains the identity, is closed under multiplication up to
scalars, and is an orthogonal basis with respect to the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product.
If N is a nice nearring and E is a nice error basis indexed by N with respect to the
character χ, then we call χ a generating character.
If a finite nearring is nice, then it satisfies the following properties.
Proposition 3 ([16]). If N is a nice nearring, then
1. a generating character χ of (N,+) is a linear and irreducible,
2. (N,+) is an abelian group,
3. and (N, ·) has a unique left identity.
Proof. See [16, Proposition 3 and 6].
So a nice nearring has considerably more structure than a general nearring, but
does not need to be right-distributive.
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A nice error basis E can be extended to n components by tensoring,
E⊗n = {M1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Mn |Mk ∈ E , 1 ≤ k ≤ n}.
This yields a nice error basis of Cqn . The elements in E generalize the Pauli matrices,
and the nice error basis E⊗n is the generalization of the Pauli basis on n qubits.
A nice error basis is not a group, since it is not closed under multiplication. The
group generated by a nice error basis is called an error group. In our case, the error
group of E⊗n is given by
En = {ωcX(a)Z(b)|a, b ∈ Nn, c ∈ Z}, (2.1)
where ω = exp(2pii/m) is a primitive mth root of unity and m is the exponent of
the group (N,+). This is a finite group with center Z(En) = {ωc1|c ∈ Z}, where 1
is the identity.
If R is a distributively generated nice nearring, then R is called a nice ring. A
distributively generated nearring is nice if and only if it is a finite Frobenius ring [16].
Finite Frobenius rings play a prominent role in classical coding theory.
Example 4. For a qubit with a basis {|0〉, |1〉} of C2, a shift operator X(1) is called a
bit-flip operator X and a multiplication operator Z(1) is called a phase-flip operator
Z, such that
X|0〉 = |1〉, X|1〉 = |0〉,
Z|0〉 = |0〉, Z|1〉 = −|1〉.
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Those operators can be represented in the form of matrices,
X =
0 1
1 0
 , Z =
1 0
0 −1
 .
Example 5. Let R be the ring of integer modulo 6, denoted Z/6Z. For a qudit with
a basis {|0〉, |1〉, ..., |5〉} of C6, the shift operators and multiplication operators are
defined by
X(a)|x〉 = |x+ a (mod 6)〉, Z(b)|x〉 = exp(2pibx/6)|x〉,
where x ∈ Z/6Z.
2.4 Classical Error Correction
In this and subsequent sections, we provide some background information about
classical and quantum error correction, see also [25].
Before discussing the theory of quantum error correction, we first recall a few
facts from the theory of classical error correction. Classical linear codes can be used
to construct a variety of quantum error correction codes. For understanding the
stabilizer formalism, we provide some fundamental ideas about classical linear codes
in this section.
We say that a linear code C encoding k bits of messages into n bits of codewords
is an [n, k] code. A way to encode information is specified by an n by k generator
matrix G. Given the k bit message x, the encoded codeword is Gx. The columns of
G are linearly independent, so the set of codewords is the vector space spanned by
the columns of G.
For the error-correction of the code, we need to consider a parity check matrix.
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The parity check matrix H is an n−k by n matrix such that Hx = 0 for all codewords
x of a code C. The rows of H are linearly independent. Suppose that we encode
the message x such that the encoded codeword is x′ = Gx. If an error e corrupts
the codeword x′ during the transmission, the receiver will get x′ + e. Since x′ is a
codeword, Hx′ = 0. When we multiply the received x′+e by the parity check matrix
H, we obtain H(x′+ e) = He. We call this the error syndrome. The error syndrome
is important for the error correction since it contains information about the error
occurred such as which bits the error corrupted.
We provide an example of a [7, 4] Hamming code for better understanding the
procedure of the error correction.
Example 6. A [7, 4] Hamming code encodes 4 bits of information into 7 bits of a
codeword, and is able to correct an error on any single bit. Its parity check matrix is
H =

0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 .
For instance, let us suppose that we transmit a codeword (1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)T . We can
easily check that this is a valid codeword in a [7, 4] Hamming code by multiplying the
codeword by the parity check matrix H. Suppose that an error occur such that the
fourth bit is flipped. Now the corrupted codeword is (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)T . We now need
to calculate the error syndrome, which is (1, 0, 0)T . In this case, the error syndrome
says that the fourth bit needs to be flipped to correct the error.
2.5 Theory of Quantum Error Correction
We need quantum error correcting codes to protect the quantum information
against noise. However, there are some aspects that we never had to consider when
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constructing classical codes. Classical information can be duplicated, but quantum
information cannot be replicated by the no-cloning theorem. This means that we
cannot construct a repetition code that replicates the message several times.
We also need to deal with the fact that errors are continuous. So detecting which
error occurred seems to require infinite precision and resources. Luckily, however,
it turns out that quantum errors can be discretized. To show this, we provide the
quantum error correction conditions. The quantum error correction conditions de-
termine whether a quantum error correcting code protects against a particular type
of noise.
Theorem 7 (Quantum error correction conditions). Let C be a quantum code, P be
the projector onto C, {Ei} be the set of quantum errors. A necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of an error-correction operation is
PE†iEjP = αijP,
for some Hermitian matrix α of complex numbers.
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 10.1 in [25].
Suppose the quantum error is a linear combination of the Ei’s. Then, this error
is also correctable by the error correction operation that can recover from {Ei}.
Therefore, we can say that it is sufficient to deal with a finite set of errors, the Pauli
matrices, instead of the continuum of errors.
In classical error correction, we can observe the output and calculate the error
syndrome to correct the errors. Observation in quantum system, however, may
destroy the information stored in the quantum state. So, we have to calculate the
error syndrome without observing the quantum state with the information directly.
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With a help of ancilla states with the conditional quantum operations, it is possible to
obtain the error syndrome without knowing any information of the quantum states.
2.6 Stabilizer Formalism and Stabilizer Codes
Stabilizer codes are an important class of quantum codes. To understand stabili-
zer codes, we need first to review the stabilizer formalism. The stabilizer formalism
gives us a way to express the quantum code using the stabilizer, instead of the actual
code space.
Suppose S is a subgroup of the error group En. Let Fix(S) be the set of n qudit
states that are fixed by every element of S. Then, we say that Fix(S) is the code
space stabilized by S, and S is the stabilizer of Fix(S). In other words, Fix(S) is
the intersection of eigenspaces with +1 eigenvalue of every elements of S. There
are some conditions that the stabilizer should satisfy for a non-trivial code space.
Obviously, −I should not be an element of S, otherwise −I|ψ〉 = |ψ〉, which is a
contradiction. In addition, the elements of S commute each other. If there are some
elements of S which do not commute, then it leads to a contradiction, too.
The stabilizer S is described by its generators. Thus, if the quantum state is
stabilized by the generators of S, then that state is stabilized by S. Let S be ge-
nerated by n − k independent and commuting elements from En, and −I /∈ S.
Then, the code space Fix(S) stabilized by S has a dimension of k. We define
an [[n, k]] stabilizer code as the code space Fix(S) stabilized by a subgroup S of
En such that −I /∈ S and S has n − k generators. For example, the Steane
seven qubit code is a [[7, 1]] stabilizer code, and its stabilizer has 6 generators,
IIIXXXX, IXXIIXX,XIXIXIX, IIIZZZZ, IZZIIZZ, and ZIZIZIZ. This
code is indeed the CSS code, and we will see how to construct this using the CSS
code construction in the next section.
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To present n−k generators of the stabilizer S, we construct an n−k by 2n matrix.
This matrix is called the check matrix. Each row of the check matrix corresponds to
each generator of S. If the generator contains an I on some qudit, then the entries
in the corresponding positions on both hand sides are 0. If it contains an X(a),
then the entry in the corresponding position on the left hand side is a and one on
the right hand side is 0. If it contains a Z(b), then the entry in the corresponding
position on the left hand side is 0, and one on the right hand side is b. For instance,
the generators of the stabilizer of the Steane seven qubit code is equivalent to the
following check matrix.

0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

Suppose a stabilizer code Fix(S) is corrupted by an error E ∈ En. We need to
distinguish three possible cases. (i) If the error E does not commute with an element
of the stabilizer S, then Fix(S) is taken to an orthogonal subspace, and the error will
be detected by measuring the generators of S. (ii) If E ∈ S, then there is nothing
to worry, since this error does not affect the code space Fix(S) at all. (iii) The last
case is when E commutes with all the elements of S, but is not a scalar multiple of
an element in S. This type of errors is not correctable.
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2.7 CSS Code Construction
The Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, or the CSS codes, are a subclass of stabi-
lizer codes. The CSS codes are very important since their constructions give us a
systematic way to build stabilizer codes.
Suppose C1 and C2 are [n, k1] and [n, k2] classical linear codes such that C2 ⊂ C1
and C1 and C
⊥
2 both correct t errors. An [[n, k1 − k2]] CSS code is constructed as
follows. Suppose x is any codeword in C1. Then,
|x+ C2〉 = 1√|C2|
∑
y∈C2
|x+ y〉.
Since the state |x+C2〉 corresponds to the coset of C1/C2, this CSS is an [[n, k1−k2]]
stabilizer code. The error correcting property of the classical code C1 is utilized
to detect and correct the addition errors, the bit flip errors in binary. The error
correcting property of C⊥2 is to detect and correct the multiplication errors, the
phase flip errors in binary.
The check matrix corresponding to the generators of the CSS code is defined as
 H(C⊥2 ) 0
0 H(C1)
 .
We give an example of the Steane code for the CSS code construction.
Example 8. We construct the Steane code using the [7, 4] Hamming code C. Let
C1 = C and C2 = C
⊥. Since C⊥ ⊂ C and C⊥ is the [7, 3] code, we can construct a
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[[7, 1]] CSS code. The check matrix is
 H(C) 0
0 H(C)
 =

0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

.
The corresponding generators are IIIXXXX, IXXIIXX,XIXIXIX, IIIZZZZ,
IZZIIZZ, and ZIZIZIZ. Thus, the stabilizer of the Steane code is generated by
these generators.
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3. SUBSYSTEM CODES OVER NICE RINGS
In this chapter, we will show one of the contributions by the author about gene-
ralization of subsystem codes over nice rings, which was published in [18]1.
Subsystem codes are one of the promising quantum error correction schemes for
the fault-tolerant quantum computation. The subsystem code formalism unifies the
features of stabilizer codes, decoherence free subspaces, and noiseless subsystems [26],
[27], [28]. The main idea of the subsystem code is to decompose a subspace C of the
Hilbert space H into a tensor product of the subsystem A and the co-subsystem B
and encode the quantum information in the subsystem [26], [27], [29] such that
H = C ⊕ C⊥ = (A⊗B)⊕ C⊥.
Since all quantum information is stored in the subsystem A, there is no need to
correct any errors affecting only the co-subsystem B.
As one of efforts to utilize nice error bases indexed by a nearring, the construction
of stabilizer codes over finite Frobenius rings was studied in [17]. In this chapter, we
provide a construction of subsystem codes over nice nearrings [18]. Thus, we gene-
ralize the results of [17] by (a) allowing for a more general nice nearring arithmetic,
and (b) generalizing from stabilizer codes to subsystem codes.
Before discussing the main results, some notations used in this chapter are given
below.
Let G be a group, and H a subgroup of G. The centralizer {g ∈ G | gh =
hg for all h ∈ H} of H in G is denoted by CG(H). The center CG(G) of G is
12013 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Sangjun Lee and Andreas Klappenecker, Subsy-
stem codes over nice rings, 2013 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory Proceedings
(ISIT), July 2013
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denoted by Z(G). For x, y ∈ G, the commutator [x, y] is defined as x−1y−1xy. Given
subgroups X and Y of G, we define [X, Y ] = 〈[x, y]|x ∈ X, y ∈ Y 〉. As usual, we
denote the commutator subgroup [X,X] by X ′.
Let N be a nice nearring. Suppose an error e in En is given by ω
cX(a)Z(b) for
a, b ∈ Nn and c ∈ Z. Then the weight wt(e) of the error e is defined as the number
of its tensor components which are not scalar multiples of the identity. Similarly,
given (a|b) ∈ N2n, we can introduce its symplectic weight by
swt(a|b) = |{i|ai 6= 0 or bi 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}|.
Thus, we have the relation wt(ωcX(a)Z(b)) = swt(a|b) between these two types of
weights.
3.1 Construction of Subsystem Codes over Nice Nearrings
In this section, we give the construction of subsystem codes over nice nearrings.
For this purpose, we use the more general theory of Clifford subsystem codes, see
[29].
Let M be a normal subgroup of an error group En and χ an irreducible character
of M . The inertia group of χ is given by
IEn(χ) = {g ∈ En |χ(gng−1) = χ(n) for all n ∈M}.
The inertia group of a character determines the parameters of the subsystem code
in the following theorem from [29]:
Theorem 9 ([29]). Let En be an error group such that E
′
n ⊆ Z(En), M a normal
subgroup of En, and χ an irreducible character of M chosen such that the orthogonal
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projector
P =
χ(1)
|N |
∑
n∈N
χ(n−1)n
is nonzero.2 Then C = image(P ) is the corresponding Clifford code. The inertia
group of χ is given by IEn(χ) = CEn(Z(M)). If CEn(Z(M)) = LM for some subgroup
L of En such that [L,M ] = 1, then C is a subsystem code C = A⊗B such that
1. dimA = |Z(En) ∩M ||En : Z(En)|1/2|M : Z(M)|1/2/|M |,
2. dimB = |M : Z(M)|1/2.
An error e in En is detectable by subsystem A if and only if e is contained in the set
En \ (CEn(Z(M)) \ Z(L)M).
Proof. See [29, Theorem 2].
We will show that Theorem 9 can be used to construct subsystem codes over nice
nearrings. For this purpose, we will prove that (a) the error group given in (2.1)
satisfies E ′n ⊆ Z(En) and (b) give a convenient condition on M which ensures that
the inertia group factorizes into a central product of the form required by Theorem 9.
The next two lemmas will establish the required facts.
Lemma 10. Let N be a finite nice nearring. The error group En = {ωcX(a)Z(b)|
a, b ∈ Nn, c ∈ Z} satisfies E ′n ⊆ Z(En).
Proof. From the definitions of the shift operator and the multiplication operator, we
know that X(a)X(b) = X(a+b) and Z(a)Z(b) = Z(a+b) for a, b ∈ N . Furthermore,
we have χ(ba)X(a)Z(b) = Z(b)X(a). Since Z(En) = {ωc1|c ∈ Z}, the quotient
group En/Z(En) is isomorphic to N
2n. By Proposition 3, a nice nearring is an
2We can always find such a character. Notice that the parameters of the resulting code do not
depend on the particular choice of χ.
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abelian group under addition. In other words, En/Z(En) is abelian, and it follows
that E ′n ⊆ Z(En), as claimed.
Our next concern is to find a convenient sufficient condition which ensures that
CEn(Z(M)) factors into a central product of the form LM for some subgroup L of
En.
A subgroup H of a group is called c-closed if and only if H = CG(CG(H)) holds.
This terminology is motivated by the fact that the centralizer map x 7→ CG(x) yields
a Galois connection on the lattice of subsets of the group G.
Lemma 11. Let En be an error group. Let M be a c-closed normal subgroup of the
error group En such that MCEn(M) is c-closed. Then
CEn(Z(M)) = MCEn(M).
Proof. Since MCEn(M) and M are c-closed, we have
MCEn(M) = CEn(CEn(MCEn(M)))
= CEn(CEn(M) ∩ CEn(CEn(M)))
= CEn(CEn(M) ∩M)
= CEn(CM(M))
= CEn(Z(M)),
which proves the claim.
The existence of normal subgroups satisfying the hypothesis of the previous
lemma follows from a well-known group-theoretic result by Chermak and Delgado,
see [30]. We can now combine the previous results and formulate the construction of
subsystem codes over nice nearrings in the following form:
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Corollary 12. Let En be the error group given in (2.1) over a nice nearring N . Let
M be a c-closed normal subgroup of En such that MCEn(M) is c-closed. Then there
exists a subsystem code C = A⊗B such that
1. dimA = |Z(En) ∩M ||En : Z(En)|1/2|M : Z(M)|1/2/|M |,
2. dimB = |M : Z(M)|1/2.
An error e in En is detectable by subsystem A if and only if e is contained in the set
En \ (MCEn(M) \M).
Proof. By Lemma 10, the error group satisfies E ′n ⊆ Z(En). By Theorem 9, the
inertia group is of the form CEn(Z(M). This inertia group factorizes into the central
product
CEn(Z(M)) = MCEn(M),
with [M,CEn(M)] = 1, by Lemma 11. Furthermore, we have
Z(CEn(M)) = CEn(CEn(M)) ∩ CEn(M)
= M ∩ CEn(M)
= Z(M)
≤ M.
Thus, the claim is obtained from Theorem 9 using L = CEn(M) and the fact that
Z(L) is a subset of M .
In the next section, we will remove the assumption on the normal subgroup M
in the case of rings.
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3.2 Construction of Subsystem Codes over Nice Rings
In this section, we will assume that N is a distributively generated nice nearring.
A distributively generated nearring is nice if and only if it is a finite Frobenius
ring [16]. Finite Frobenius rings play a prominent role in classical coding theory. We
will relate the construction of subsystem codes over nice rings to classical codes over
rings. We will use R instead of N to denote a nice ring.
Let R be a nice ring. For u = (a|b) and v = (a′|b′) in R2n, we define
〈u|v〉 = χ(b · a′ − b′ · a).
We write u ⊥ v if and only if 〈u|v〉 = 1 holds. Thus, X(a)Z(b) and X(a′)Z(b′)
commute if and only if u ⊥ v. For a subset S ⊆ R2n, we define
S⊥ = {u ∈ R2n | 〈s|u〉 = 1 for all s ∈ S}
⊥S = {u ∈ R2n | 〈u|s〉 = 1 for all s ∈ S}
One can show that for a subgroup C of R2n, we have
|C||C⊥| = |⊥C||C| = |R2n|,
see [17, Lemma 6].
For a subgroup G of the error group En, we use the bar notation G to denote
G/Z(En).
A key element in the construction of subsystem codes is the decomposition of
the inertia group of the character χ into a central product (the groups L and M in
Theorem 9). The next lemma shows that this is always possible when R is a nice
ring.
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Without loss of generality, we may assume that the normal subgroup M of the
error group En contains the center Z(En) of the error group. If M does not contain
Z(En), then simply use the larger group MZ(En),
Lemma 13. Let R be a finite nice ring. If En is a set {ωcX(a)Z(b)|a, b ∈ Rn, c ∈ Z}
and M is a normal subgroup of En, then CEn(Z(M)) = MCEn(M).
Proof. We first notice that MCEn(M) is a subgroup of CEn(Z(M)), and that both
groups contain the center Z(En) of the error group. Thus, it suffices to show that
the cardinality of the quotient groups MCEn(M) and CEn(Z(M)) are the same. We
have
|MCEn(M)| =|M +M⊥|
=|M ||M⊥|/|M ∩M⊥|
=|M ||M⊥|/|Z(M)|
=|R2n|/|Z(M)|
=|Z(M)⊥|
=|CEn(Z(M))|,
which proves our claim.
From the previous two results, we can conclude the following theorem about the
construction of subsystem codes over a nice ring.
Theorem 14. Let R be a finite nice ring. Suppose the error group En is a set
{ωcX(a)Z(b)|a, b ∈ Rn, c ∈ Z}. If C is a Clifford code with data (En, ρ,M, χ) with
M 6= 1, then C is a subsystem code C = A⊗B such that
1. dimA = |Z(En) ∩M ||En : Z(En)|1/2|M : Z(M)|1/2/|M |,
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2. dimB = |M : Z(M)|1/2.
An error e in En is detectable by subsystem A if and only if e is contained in the set
En − (MCEn(M)−M).
Proof. By Lemma 10, the error group En satisfies E
′
n ⊆ Z(En). Thus, the inertia
group IEn(χ) = CEn(Z(M)). By Lemma 13, we have CEn(Z(M)) = MCEn(M).
Since CEn(M) ≤ En and [CEn(M),M ] = 1, the resulting Clifford code is a subsystem
code C = A⊗B with dimA and dimB as given in Theorem 9.
In addition, since Z(En) ≤ M and [CEn(M),M ] = 1, Z(CEn(M)) ⊆ CEn(M) ∩
CEn(M)
⊥ ⊆ M⊥ ∩M ⊆ M. Thus, we have the relation M ⊆ Z(CEn(M))M ⊆ M ,
which means Z(CEn(M))M = M . Therefore, an error e in En is detectable if and
only if e ∈ En − (MCEn(M)−M).
Now we are ready to construct subsystem codes from classical additive codes over
a nice ring.
Theorem 15. Let R be a nice ring with q elements. Let X be a classical additive
subcode of R2n such that X 6= {0} and let Y denote its subcode Y = X ∩ X⊥. Let
x = |X| and y = |Y |. Then, there exists a subsystem code C = A⊗B such that
1. dimA = qn/(xy)1/2,
2. dimB = (x/y)1/2.
The minimum distance of subsystem A is given by d = swt((X + X⊥) − X) =
swt(Y ⊥ −X). Thus, the subsystem A can detect all errors in En of weight less than
d, and can correct all errors in En of weight ≤ b(d− 1)/2c.
Proof. Let En be the nice error group given earlier, and let M be the full preimage
of M = X in En under the canonical quotient map. Then, we can apply Theorem
14 to prove the theorem.
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Since Z(M) = X ∩X⊥ = Y , |M : Z(M)| = |M : Z(M)| = x/y. Thus, dimB =
(x/y)1/2. From the fact that Z(En) ≤ M by definition, |Z(En) ∩M |/|M | = 1/M =
1/x. Therefore, dimA = |En : Z(En)|1/2/(xy)1/2 = qn/(xy)1/2.
Since wt(e) = swt(e) for an error e ∈ En, the minimum distance of subsystem A
is wt(MCEn(M)−M) = swt(MCEn(M)−M) = swt((X +X⊥)−X). Equivalently,
wt(CEn(Z(M))−M) = swt(CEn(Z(M))−M) = swt(Y ⊥ −X).
Let R be a nice ring. Suppose K = dimA, L = dimB and d is a minimum
distance of subsystem A. Then, a subsystem code Q over a nice ring is called
an ((n,K,L, d))R subsystem code. We also write [[n, k, l, d]]R for an ((n, q
k, ql, d))R
subsystem code, where q is the number of elements in R. By slight abuse of language,
we will also refer to d as the minimum distance of the subsystem code Q, cf. [28].
Next, we will derive a special case of Theorem 15, which constructs a subsystem
code over a nice ring with the help of two classical linear codes over a nice ring of
the same length n. This generalizes a result from [28] by allowing finite rings instead
of finite fields.
Let a, b, a′, b′ be in Rn. We define a form 〈·|·〉s : R2n ×R2n → R by
〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉s = b · a′ − b′ · a.
Suppose u and v are in R2n such that u = (a|b) and v = (a′|b′). Then, we define the
orthogonality u ⊥s v if and only if 〈u|v〉s = 0.
Lemma 16. Let C1 and C2 be two linear codes over a nice ring R such that C1 ≤ Rn
and C2 ≤ Rn. The product code C1 × C2 = {(a|b)|a ∈ C1, b ∈ C2} has length 2n and
its dual is given by
(C1 × C2)⊥s = C⊥s2 × C⊥s1
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Proof. If (a|b) ∈ C1 × C2 and (b′|a′) ∈ C⊥s2 × C⊥s1 , then 〈(a|b)|(b′|a′)〉 = b · b′ −
a′ · a = 0. Thus, C⊥s2 × C⊥s1 ⊆ (C1 × C2)⊥s . Since |(C1 × C2)⊥s| = |R|2n/|C1 ×
C2| = |R|2n/|C1||C2| = |R|n/|C2| · |R|n/|C1| = |C⊥s2 × C⊥s1 |, we can conclude that
(C1 × C2)⊥s = C⊥s2 × C⊥s1 .
Corollary 17. Let R be a nice ring with q elements. Let Ci be [n, ki] linear codes in
Rn for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, there exists an ((n,K,L, d))R subsystem code with
1. K = qn−(k1+k2)/2/|D|1/2,
2. L = q(k1+k2)/2/|D|1/2,
3. d = min{wt((C⊥s1 ∩ C2)⊥s\C1),wt((C⊥s2 ∩ C1)⊥s\C2)},
where |D| = |C1 ∩ C⊥s2 ||C2 ∩ C⊥s1 |.
Proof. Let C = C1 × C2, then by Lemma 16, C⊥s = C⊥s2 × C⊥s1 . Using C and C⊥s ,
we get D = C ∩ C⊥s = (C1 ∩ C⊥s2 )× (C2 ∩ C⊥s1 ). Since |C| = |C1||C2| = qk1+k2 , we
can obtain that K = qn−(k1+k2)/2/|D|1/2 and L = q(k1+k2)/2/|D|1/2 by Theorem 15.
The distance of the code is provided in Theorem 15 by
d = swt(D⊥s\C)
= swt((C2 ∩ C⊥s1 )⊥s × (C1 ∩ C⊥s2 )⊥s\(C1 × C2)),
which can be simplified to
d = min{wt((C2 ∩ C⊥s1 )⊥s\C1),wt((C1 ∩ C⊥s2 )⊥s\C2)}.
Therefore, we can have an ((n,K,L, d))R subsystem code from C1 and C2.
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In particular, an subsystem code ((n,K,L, d))R with simplified code parameters
can be obtained by setting C1 = C2, where K = q
n−k/|D|, L = qk/|D|, |D| =
|C1 ∩ C⊥s1 | and d = wt((C1 ∩ C⊥s1 )⊥s\C1).
3.3 Subsystem Codes over Rings and Fields
Now, we will discuss a finite chain ring to show how to derive the subsystem code
over a field from the subsystem code over a ring. A finite chain ring is a well-known
ring structure for a classical code [31], [32]. Since ideals of a finite chain ring construct
a form of a chain, it has a unique maximal ideal. A finite chain ring is Frobenius
ring, which implies that a finite chain ring is a nice distributively generated nearring
[16]. In order to discuss the relation between the subsystem code over a ring and a
finite field, we restrict our focus into a finite chain ring.
Let R be a finite chain ring with the Jacobson radical J(R) and the nilpotency
index ν. Then, J(R) is the maximal ideal of R since a finite chain ring is a local ring
and it has a unique maximal ideal. Thus, the quotient ring R/J(R) becomes a field.
Let F be such a residue field. Suppose that a field R/J(R) has q elements. Then,
we have |R| = qν and |J(R)| = qν−1 [31].
Let c ∈ Rn. We denote by c the image of c under the canonical projection from
Rn to F n. Let C ⊆ Rn. Then, we denote C = {c|c ∈ C}.
We define the submodule quotient (C : r) as a set {e ∈ R2n|re ∈ C} for any
code C ≤ R2n and any r ∈ R. The submodule quotient and its image under the
projection have following chain conditions [31]
C = (C : γ0) ⊆ · · · ⊆ (C : γi) ⊆ · · · ⊆ (C : γν−1),
and its projection to F ,
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C = (C : γ0) ⊆ · · · ⊆ (C : γi) ⊆ · · · ⊆ (C : γν−1).
In order to know the relation between the subsystem code over a ring and that
over a field, we need to first show the relation of the symplectic weights of a code
over a ring and that over its residue field.
Lemma 18. Let R be a finite chain ring, γ a generator of the Jacobson radical J(R)
and ν the nilpotency index. Let X be a classical additive code of R2n and Y its
subcode Y = X ∩X⊥s. Then,
swt(Y ⊥s −X) ≤ swt(Y ⊥s − (X : α)),
where α = γν−1.
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ Y ⊥s−(X : α). Then, we know αx ∈ Y ⊥s−X. This means
that α(Y ⊥s−(X : α)) ⊆ Y ⊥s−X. Therefore, swt(Y ⊥s−X) ≤ swt(α(Y ⊥s−(X : α))).
We define the map ϕ : αR2n → F 2n given by ϕ(αx) = x. Since ϕ is an iso-
morphism and preserves the weight [32], we can say that this map also preserves
the symplectic weight. Thus, we have the relation that swt(α(Y ⊥s − (X : α))) =
swt(Y ⊥S − (X : α)). Then,
swt(Y ⊥s −X) ≤ swt(α(Y ⊥s − (X : α)))
= swt(Y ⊥s − (X : α))
Therefore, we can conclude that swt(Y ⊥s −X) ≤ swt(Y ⊥s − (X : α)).
For the simpler analysis of the relation between the subsystem code over a ring
and a field, we will focus on the free code. The free code over a ring has the following
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properties [31].
Let C be a free code over R. Then, the dual code C⊥s is also a free code. The
number of rows in a generator matrix in standard form k(C) is k0(C), which is the
number of rows not divisible by γi for 1 ≤ i ≤ ν − 1. In addition, C = (C : γ) =
· · · = (C : γν−1).
Theorem 19. If an ((n,K,L, d))R free subsystem code exists over a finite chain
ring with the Jacobson radical J(R) and the nilpotency index ν, then there exists an
((n,K1/ν , L1/ν ,≥ d))q subsystem code over a field R/J(R) with q elements.
Proof. By Theorem 15, there are the classical additive code X ⊆ R2n and its subcode
Y = X ∩ X⊥s , which are associated with an ((n,K,L, d))R subsystem code. Since
an ((n,K,L, d))R subsystem code is a free code, X and Y are free codes. Suppose
that generator matrices of X and Y have the numbers of rows k0 and k
′
0, respecti-
vely. Then, |X| = qνk0 and |Y | = qνk′0 [31]. Therefore, K = |R|n/qν(k0+k′0)/2 =
qν(n−(k0+k
′
0)/2) and L = qν(k0−k
′
0)/2.
Now we consider X and Y , which are the subset of F 2n. Since dim(X) = k0 and
dim(Y ) = k′0 [31], we have |X| = qk0 and |Y | = qk′0 . By [29, Theorem 5], we can
have an ((n,K ′, L′, d′))q subsystem code using X and Y , where K ′ = qn−(k0+k
′
0)/2
and L′ = q(k0−k
′
0)/2. Since K ′ = K1/ν and L′ = L1/ν , we conclude that there exists
an ((n,K1/ν , L1/ν , d′))q subsystem code over a finite field with q elements.
Since a free code has a property that X = (X : α) [31], the minimum distance
d′ = swt(Y ⊥s −X) = swt(Y ⊥s − (X : α)) ≥ swt(Y ⊥s−X) = d, where the inequality
is from Lemma 18.
Changing a notation to a simpler one, the derived subsystem code over a finite
field has same parameters as the free subsystem code over a finite chain ring except
for their distances.
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Corollary 20. If an [[n, k, l, d]]R free subsystem code exists over a finite chain ring,
then there exists an [[n, k, l,≥ d]]q subsystem code over a finite field.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 19, an ((n,K,L, d))R free subsystem code can be
called an [[n, n − (k0 + k′0)/2, (k0 − k′0)/2, d]]R free subsystem code since |R| = qν .
Using the fact that |F | = q, an ((n,K1/ν , L1/ν ,≥ d))q subsystem code can be called
an [[n, n−(k0+k′0)/2, (k0−k′0)/2,≥ d]]q subsystem code. By letting k = n−(k0+k′0)/2
and l = (k0−k′0)/2, we can conclude that an [[n, k, l,≥ d]]q code can be derived from
an [[n, k, l, d]]R code.
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4. ENTANGLEMENT-ASSISTED QUANTUM ERROR CORRECTING CODES
OVER NICE RINGS
In this chapter, the generalization of the other quantum error correcting scheme,
entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting code over nice rings, which was pu-
blished in [19]1, will be given.
Entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting codes (EAQECCs), which are
quantum codes with the pre-shared entanglement between the sender and the re-
ceiver, have been introduced [33, 34]. Unlike the stabilizer codes, these codes do
not have a restriction that classical codes should be dual-containing codes for con-
structing the quantum codes. Thus, using this construction with a help of the en-
tanglement, any classical codes can be used in order to derive the corresponding
quantum codes. The constructions of the binary and quaternary EAQECCs were
well-established [33, 34] and the formalism of the generalized EAQECCs combining
EAQECCs and subsystem quantum error correcting codes was investigated [35].
What we now show is that the entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting
codes can be generalized over nice rings, so that these codes can also be not restricted
to power prime dimensions [19].
We will use the two types of forms to connect the commutativity with the ortho-
gonality. From [17], we have a form to use over R-module instead of the symplectic
inner product over a finite field. For each additive character χ, a unique function ψ
12014 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Sangjun Lee and Andreas Klappenecker,
Entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting codes over nice rings, 2014 52nd Annual Aller-
ton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), October 2014
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in Hom(R,Q/Z) exists such that
χ(x) = exp (2piiψ(x)).
Using the function ψ, we define a form 〈·|·〉χ : R2n ×R2n → Q/Z such that
〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉χ = ψ(b · a′ − b′ · a)
for all (a|b), (a′|b′) ∈ R2n.
Let u = (a|b) and v = (a′|b′) in R2n. We say that u ⊥ v if and only if 〈u|v〉χ = 0.
This implies that X(a)Z(b) commutes with X(a′)Z(b′) if and only if u ⊥ v [17].
There is an another inner product [18], which may be preferred to use in this
setting, which is defined by
〈(a|b)|(a′|b′)〉 = χ(b · a′ − b′ · a)
for all (a|b), (a′|b′) ∈ R2n.
Since this form uses the additive character χ directly, X(a)Z(b) and X(a′)Z(b′)
commute if and only if χ(b · a′ − b′ · a) = 1 [17]. Thus, this inner product has an
orthogonal property such that u ⊥ v if and only if 〈u|v〉 = 1. It is easily seen that
〈u|v〉 = 1 is equivalent to 〈u|v〉χ = 0 since ψ is in Hom(R,Q/Z). Both forms share
the same orthogonal condition.
We would like to recall the definitions of the weight and the symplectic weight.
Given an error e = ωcX(a)Z(b) in an error group for a, b ∈ Rn and c ∈ Z, the
weight wt(e) is defined as the number of its tensor components which are not scalar
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multiples of the identity. The symplectic weight of (a|b) ∈ R2n is defined by
swt(a|b) = |{i|ai 6= 0 or bi 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}|.
It is easily seen that wt(ωcX(a)Z(b)) = swt(a|b).
4.1 Symplectic Abelian Groups
In [36], an antisymmetric bicharacter on finite abelian groups is introduced. The
inner product 〈·|·〉 is indeed one of such antisymmetric bicharacters since 〈(a|b)|(a|b)〉
= χ(0) = 1. A finite abelian group with an antisymmetric bicharacter is called a
finite symplectic abelian group. It is known that a finite symplectic abelian group
can have a decomposition as an orthogonal direct sum of Sylow p-subgroups and a
primary symplectic abelian group can be splitted as an orthogonal direct sum of its
homogeneous components [37]. A primary abelian group is called homogeneous if
all of its invariants are equal. It is known that any finite abelian group is a direct
product of homogeneous subgroups such that no two distinct factors have a common
invariant. Such subgroups are called the homogeneous components of a group. Each
homogeneous component can indeed be splitted into an orthogonal direct sum of
hyperbolic subgroups [37, 36]. A subgroup of a symplectic abelian group is called
hyperbolic if the subgroup is nonsingular and H ∼= Zpn × Zpn for some prime p and
some integer n ≥ 1.
R2n with the inner product 〈·|·〉 is considered as a symplectic abelian group since
〈·|·〉 is the antisymmetric bicharacter [36], which defines a symmetric relation of
orthogonality, and R2n is a R-module. Then, we can have
Theorem 21. If R2n is a nondegenerate abelian group with 〈·|·〉 and R2n = H1 ⊕
· · · ⊕ Hm is any decomposition as the direct sum of homogeneous components such
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that each homogeneous component has an even rank of ri = 2si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
then R2n admits a decomposition into the orthogonal direct sum of
∑
i si hyperbolic
subgroups.
Proof. Each homogeneous component Hi is nondegenerate since R
2n is nondegene-
rate, and a nondegenerate, homogeneous, symplectic, abelian group of even rank 2s
is splitted into the orthogonal direct sum of s hyperbolic subgroups [36].
The following lemmas provide proofs that R2n is decomposed as an orthogonal
direct sum of hyperbolic subgroups like the symplectic linear spaces.
Lemma 22. Let R2n be a nondegenerate abelian group with 〈·|·〉. Then, there is
homogeneous components of R2n such that an orthogonal direct sum of those homo-
geneous components is R2n.
Proof. Any finite abelian group can be decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum of
its Sylow p-subgroups [37]. A primary symplectic abelian group can be decomposed
as an orthogonal direct sum of homogeneous components [37, 36]. Therefore, it
is clear that R2n can be decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum of homogeneous
components.
Lemma 23. Let R2n be a nondegenerate abelian group with 〈·|·〉. A homogeneous
component of R2n can be decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum of hyperbolic sub-
groups.
Proof. Since a homogeneous component of R2n is a homogeneous nondegenerate
abelian p-group, it is decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum of two isomorphic
isotropic cyclic subgroups, which are called hyperbolic subgroups [37, 36].
Using two lemmas above, we now have the following result.
33
Theorem 24. Let R2n be a nondegenerate abelian group with 〈·|·〉. Then, R2n can
be decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum of hyperbolic subgroups.
Proof. From Lemmas 22 and 23, R2n can be decomposed as an orthogonal direct sum
of homogeneous components, and each homogeneous component can be decomposed
as an orthogonal direct sum of hyperbolic subgroups.
4.2 Entanglement-Assisted Quantum Codes over Nice Rings
It was known that (Z2)2n is a symplectic subspace of itself [33, 34]. This implies
that there exists a symplectic basis of (Z2)2n consisting of n hyperbolic pairs. From
previous section, we now know that R2n also can be decomposed as an orthogonal
direct sum of hyperbolic subgroups like a vector space. In addition, the form 〈·|·〉 = 1
is equivalent to 〈·|·〉χ = 0, so they both have the same orthogonal condition.
We will show how to find a symplectic basis and an isotropic basis generating a
free submodule of R2n. A subgroup is called symplectic if it is generated by a set
of anti-commuting generator pairs, a symplectic basis, and a subgroup is isotropic if
it is generated by a set of commuting generators, an isotropic basis [38]. The form
〈·|·〉χ, not 〈·|·〉, will be used as an inner product in order to follow the approach
similarly, which was provided for a vector space over a finite field [33, 34].
We denote an element in Q/Z by [a
b
], such that (a, b) is co-prime and 0 ≤ a
b
< 1.
Then, we choose a
b
as a representative of [a
b
].
Theorem 25. Let R be a commutative nice ring. Let M be a free submodule of
R2n with a rank m. Then, there exists a symplectic basis of R2n with hyperbo-
lic pairs (ui,vi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that 〈ui|uj〉χ = 0 for all i, j, 〈vi|vj〉χ =
0 for all i, j, 〈ui|vj〉χ = 0 for all i 6= j and 〈ui|vi〉χ 6= 0 for all i. A basis
{u1, · · · ,uc+s,v1, · · · ,vc} generates M for some c, s ≥ 0 with 2c+ s = m.
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Proof. Since M is a free submodule of R2n with a rank m, we can pick a set of basis
{w1, · · · ,w2n} for R2n such that {w1, · · · ,wm} is a basis for M .
The following algorithm runs n rounds, and one pair (ui,vi) is calculated in each
round.
Initially, we have i = 1, m′ = m and U = V = Ø. In ith round,
1. For w1, · · · ,w2(n−i+1) and u1, · · · ,ui−1,v1, · · · ,vi−1, the followings are satis-
fied.
(a) {w1, · · · ,w2(n−i+1),u1, · · · ,ui−1,v1, · · · ,vi−1} is a basis for R2n.
(b) 〈uj|wk〉χ = 0 and 〈vj|wk〉χ = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ i−1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2(n− i+1).
(c) M = span{uj : j ∈ U} ⊕ span{vl : l ∈ V } ⊕ span{wk : 1 ≤ k ≤ m′}.
2. Choose ui = w1. If m
′ ≥ 1, then add i to U . Let t ≥ 2 be the smallest index
such that 〈w1|wt〉χ 6= 0. Set vi = wt.
3. If t ≤ m′:
The hyperbolic pair (ui,vi) are in a set of generators generating M . Add i to
V , and swap wt with w2.
For k = 3, · · · , 2(n − i + 1), a new basis that is orthogonal to the hyperbolic
pair (ui,vi) is computed.
Let 〈vi|ui〉χ = [xiyi ], 〈vi|wk〉χ = [
ak
bk
], and 〈ui|wk〉χ = [ ckdk ], where
xi
yi
, ak
bk
, and
ck
dk
are representatives of [xi
yi
], [ak
bk
], and [ ck
dk
], respectively. Let ak
bk
· yi
xi
=
gk,i
hk,i
and
ck
dk
· yi
xi
=
rk,i
sk,i
, where (gk,i, hk,i) and (rk,i, sk,i) are co-prime, respectively. In order
to have all coefficients in the following equation as integers, the least common
multiple of two denominators is calculated. Let ek,i = lcm(hk,i, sk,i). Then,
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w′k−2 = ek,iwk − ek,i gk,i
hk,i
ui − ek,i rk,i
sk,i
vi,
so that
〈w′k−2|ui〉χ = 〈w′k−2|vi〉χ = 0.
Then, set m′ = m− 2 since we found two generators of M .
If t > m′:
One of the hyperbolic pair ui is in a set of generators generating M , but another
one vi is out of a set of generators of M . Swap wt with w2(n−i+1).
For k = 2, · · · , 2(n − i) + 1, a new basis that is orthogonal to the hyperbolic
pair (ui,vi) is computed.
Let 〈vi|ui〉χ = [xiyi ], 〈vi|wk〉χ = [
ak
bk
], and 〈ui|wk〉χ = [ ckdk ], where
xi
yi
, ak
bk
, and
ck
dk
are representatives of [xi
yi
], [ak
bk
], and [ ck
dk
], respectively. Let ak
bk
· yi
xi
=
gk,i
hk,i
and
ck
dk
· yi
xi
=
rk,i
sk,i
, where (gk,i, hk,i) and (rk,i, sk,i) are co-prime, respectively. To
have all coefficients as integers, the least common multiple is calculated. Let
ek,i = lcm(hk,i, sk,i). Then,
w′k−1 = ek,iwk − ek,i
gk,i
hk,i
ui − ek,i rk,i
sk,i
vi,
so that
〈w′k−1|ui〉χ = 〈w′k−1|vi〉χ = 0.
Then, set m′ = m− 1 if m′ ≥ 1, since we only found one generator of M .
4. wk = wk
′ for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2(n− i).
Reordering u′js and v
′
js may be required to put the hyperbolic pairs in a set of
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generators of M first and the remaining u′js following the hyperbolic pairs.
Let ui = (a1, · · · , an|b1, · · · , bn) ∈ R2n, where ai, bi ∈ R for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The
corresponding quantum error is defined as X(a1)Z(b1)⊗ · · · ⊗X(an)Z(bn).
Lemma 26. Let Gn be a nice error basis indexed by a nice ring R with q elements.
Let S be a subgroup in Gn with qm elements up to scalar. Then, there exists a set
of m independent generators {Z1, Z2, · · · , Zc, · · · , Zc+s, X1, · · · , Xc} for S such that
[Zi, Zj] = 0 for all i, j, [Xi, Xj] = 0 for all i, j, [Zi, Xj] = 0 for all i 6= j and
[Zi, Xi] 6= 0 for all i.
Proof. From Theorem 25, it is guaranteed that we can have such a set of generators.
Suppose that we have a subgroup S in Gn generated by the noncommuting set
of generators. From Lemma 26, we can obtain a new set of generators consisting of
c hyperbolic pairs and s commuting generators, where c is the number of entangled-
qudits and s is the number of ancilla qudits, which are ebits and ancilla bits for
binary quantum codes [33]. We label two generators in each hyperbolic pair as Zi
and Xi for 1 ≤ i ≤ c, and commuting generators as Zi for c+ 1 ≤ i ≤ c+ s. As [33]
has done, we can find a new group generated by commuting generators by extending
the generators. The only different thing from [33] is that this is not just a binary
case, but the generalized one over a nice ring.
For a hyperbolic pair (a|b) and (a′|b′) in R2n, let Zi = X(a)Z(b) and Xi =
X(a′)Z(b′). Then, we know χ(b · a′ − b′ · a) 6= 1 since Zi and Xi do not commute.
Let Z(s) and X(t) be operators to be appended to Zi and Xi, respectively, to obtain
the commuting pair for some s, t ∈ R. The extended pairs Z ′i = X(a|0)Z(b|s) and
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X ′i = X(a
′|t)Z(b′|0) commute if and only if χ((b|s) · (a′|t)− (b′|0) · (a|0)) = 1. This
implies that χ(b · a′ − b′ · a)χ(st) = 1, thus st = b′ · a − b · a′. We can easily pick s
and t in R satisfying st = b′ · a − b · a′. The trivial case may be to pick s = 1 or
t = 1. By appending c entangled-qudits, we now have the extended set of commuting
generators. It is assumed that the original qudits are possessed by Alice, and the
appended qudits are possessed by Bob and are error-free.
With the generators with appended qudits, EAQECC over a nice ring can be con-
structed. Initially, a state |Φ〉AB|0〉⊗s|ψ〉⊗k is prepared, where |Φ〉AB = 1√|R|
∑
x∈R |x〉|x〉
is a generalized Bell state, which is a maximally entangled state shared between Alice
and Bob, |ψ〉⊗k contains the quantum information to transmit, and k is a number of
logical qudits. After encoding process on qudits possessed by Alice, the code space
is now stabilized by the generators. A half of the entangled pair is possessed by
Bob, and that is assumed to be error-free, so that Bob can measure the extended
generators on the transmitted qudits along with his entangled pair.
Let n be a number of physical qudits, k a number of logical qudits, d a minimum
distance, and c a number of entangled-qudits or a number of hyperbolic pairs. Then,
an EAQECC over a nice ring is called an [[n, k, d; c]]R EAQECC.
Proposition 27. Let R be a nice ring. If a classical [n, k, d]R code exists, then an
[[n, 2k − n + c, d; c]]R EAQECC exists, where c is the number of hyperbolic pairs in
the symplectic basis.
Proof. The classical [n, k, d]R code has a (n−k)×n parity-check matrix H. Using H,
we can construct a 2(n− k)× 2n parity-check matrix H˜ for CSS construction. From
Lemma 25 and Theorem 26, we know it is possible to find generators {Z1, Z2, · · · , Zc,
· · · , Zc+s, X1, · · · , Xc}, where 2c+s = 2(n−k). By appending appropriate qudits for
extended commuting generators, we finally set the entanglement-assisted quantum
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error correcting code. For any nonzero (a|b) ∈ R2n such that swt(a|b) < d, the
syndrome of (a|b) is nonzero by the definition of the minimum distance. It means
that any error e = χ(c)X(a)Z(b) such that wt(e) < d can be detected. Therefore,
the constructed EAQECC is the [[n, 2k − n + c, d; c]]R code, where c is the number
of hyperbolic pairs in the symplectic basis.
4.3 Examples
One of good examples for constructing EAQECCs is quantum LDPC code. The
classical LDPC codes are well-known as capacity-approaching codes, so there has
been many investigations on them. But because they are not generally dual-containing
codes, which are usually used to construct quantum codes, there has been many at-
tempts to find dual-containing classical LDPC codes for CSS construction [39]. It
has been relatively easy to find dual-containing LDPC codes with a short length,
but difficult to find long LDPC codes. The entanglement-assisted quantum code
construction, however, has no dual-containing constraints, so constructing quantum
LDPC codes directly from classical LDPC codes can be possible [40].
Here, we provide some examples to show that it is possible to employ any LDPC
codes directly to construct quantum codes with an entanglement-assistance.
4.3.1 [[6,1;1]] Quantum Binary LDPC Code
The classical irregular [6,3] binary LDPC code has a following parity-check ma-
trix.
H =

1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0
 .
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For a CSS construction, we have the parity-check matrix from above.
H˜ =
 H 0
0 H
 .
From H˜, the stabilizer group has the following noncommuting generators.
M1 = Z Z Z Z I I
M2 = I I Z Z I Z
M3 = Z I I Z Z I
M4 = X X X X I I
M5 = I I X X I X
M6 = X I I X X I
Using Lemma 25, we obtain the symplectic basis and the isotropic basis to generate
the stabilizer group. The function ψ ∈ Hom(R,Q/Z) is ψ(x) = x/2. The additive
character χ is χ(x) = exp(2piiψ(x)) = exp(piix).
Z1 = I I Z Z I Z
X1 = I I X X I X
Z2 = Z Z Z Z I I
Z3 = X X X X I I
Z4 = I Z I Z Z Z
Z5 = I X I X X X
It is shown that a pair (Z1, X1) is only a hyperbolic pair in a generator set, and
they commute with any generators in an isotropic space. The number of hyperbolic
pairs is just one, and the number of generators in an isotropic space is four, which
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imply that c=1 and s=4, so the number of logical qubits is k=1. Thus, this quantum
LDPC code is [[6,1;1]] code. The following is the generators with an appended qubit
belonging to a receiver Bob.
Z1 = I I Z Z I Z Z
X1 = I I X X I X X
Z2 = Z Z Z Z I I I
Z3 = X X X X I I I
Z4 = I Z I Z Z Z I
Z5 = I X I X X X I
By appending Z to Z1, X to X1, and I to the remainder, the generators with the
appended become commuting each other.
4.3.2 [[8,3;3]] Quantum LDPC Code over F16
The finite field F16 with 16 elements can be understood as the residue class ring
F16 = F2[x]/〈x4 + x + 1〉, so a residue class can be represented by a polynomial
a+ bx+ cx2 +dx3 over F2. Since we do not have much space, we choose to represent
the elements of F16 by integers from 0 to 15 as follows:
0 = (0, 0, 0, 0), 1 = (1, 0, 0, 0), 2 = (0, 1, 0, 0), 3 = (0, 0, 1, 0),
4 = (0, 0, 0, 1), 5 = (1, 1, 0, 0), 6 = (0, 1, 1, 0), 7 = (0, 0, 1, 1),
8 = (1, 1, 0, 1), 9 = (1, 0, 1, 0), 10 = (0, 1, 0, 1),11 = (1, 1, 1, 0),
12 = (0, 1, 1, 1),13 = (1, 1, 1, 1),14 = (1, 0, 1, 1),15 = (1, 0, 0, 1),
where (a, b, c, d) consists of the coefficients of the polynomial. The addition and
multiplication tables are provided below in Table 4.1.
The parity-check matrix of the classical (2,4)-regular [8,4] LDPC code over F16 is
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Table 4.1: The addition and multiplication tables over F16
+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 1 0 5 9 15 2 11 14 10 3 8 6 13 12 7 4
2 2 5 0 6 10 1 3 12 15 11 4 9 7 14 13 8
3 3 9 6 0 7 11 2 4 13 1 12 5 10 8 15 14
4 4 15 10 7 0 8 12 3 5 14 2 13 6 11 9 1
5 5 2 1 11 8 0 9 13 4 6 15 3 14 7 12 10
6 6 11 3 2 12 9 0 10 14 5 7 1 4 15 8 13
7 7 14 12 4 3 13 10 0 11 15 6 8 2 5 1 9
8 8 10 15 13 5 4 14 11 0 12 1 7 9 3 6 2
9 9 3 11 1 14 6 5 15 12 0 13 2 8 10 4 7
10 10 8 4 12 2 15 7 6 1 13 0 14 3 9 11 5
11 11 6 9 5 13 3 1 8 7 2 14 0 15 4 10 12
12 12 13 7 10 6 14 4 2 9 8 3 15 0 1 5 11
13 13 12 14 8 11 7 15 5 3 10 9 4 1 0 2 6
14 14 7 13 15 9 12 8 1 6 4 11 10 5 2 0 3
15 15 4 8 14 1 10 13 9 2 7 5 12 11 6 3 0
× 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
2 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1
3 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2
4 0 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3
5 0 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4
6 0 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5
7 0 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6
8 0 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9 0 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
10 0 10 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
11 0 11 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
12 0 12 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
13 0 13 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
14 0 14 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
15 0 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
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generated by the method that selects the coefficients of the matrices using a Monte
Carlo method [41]:
H =

0 15 2 0 0 6 0 4
15 9 0 11 0 13 0 0
0 0 3 0 1 0 14 5
5 0 0 7 3 0 9 0

.
From the parity-check matrix H˜ for a CSS construction, the stabilizer group has the
following eight noncommuting generators:
M1 = I Z(15) Z(2) I I Z(6) I Z(4)
M2 = Z(15) Z(9) I Z(11) I Z(13) I I
M3 = I I Z(3) I Z(1) I Z(14) Z(5)
M4 = Z(5) I I Z(7) Z(3) I Z(9) I
M5 = I X(15) X(2) I I X(6) I X(4)
M6 = X(15) X(9) I X(11) I X(13) I I
M7 = I I X(3) I X(1) I X(14) X(5)
M8 = X(5) I I X(7) X(3) I X(9) I
From Lemma 25, the symplectic basis and the isotropic basis generating the stabilizer
group can be calculated. The function ψ(x) is
tr24/2(x)
2
, where trpm/p(x) is the absolute
trace from Fpm to Fp defined as trpm/p(x) =
∑m−1
k=0 x
pk . The additive character χ is
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given by χ(x) = exp(piitr24/2(x)).
Z1 = I Z(15) Z(2) I I Z(6) I Z(4)
X1 = X(15) X(9) I X(11) I X(13) I I
Z2 = I I Z(3) I Z(1) I Z(14) Z(5)
X2 = I I X(3) I X(1) I X(14) X(5)
Z3 = I X(15) X(2) I I X(6) I X(4)
X3 = Z(15) Z(9) I Z(11) I Z(13) I I
Z4 = Z(5) Z(15) Z(6) Z(7) Z(9) Z(6) Z(4) Z(8)
Z5 = X(5) X(15) X(6) X(7) X(9) X(6) X(4) X(8)
There are three pairs (Zi, Xi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and two generators Z4 and Z5 in the
isotropic basis. Thus, we can construct the [[8,3;3]] LDPC code over GF (16) having
the following generators with appended qudits.
Z1 = I Z(15) Z(2) I I Z(6) I Z(4) Z(13) I I
X1 = X(15) X(9) I X(11) I X(13) I I X(1) I I
Z2 = I I Z(3) I Z(1) I Z(14) Z(5) I Z(15) I
X2 = I I X(3) I X(1) I X(14) X(5) I X(1) I
Z3 = I X(15) X(2) I I X(6) I X(4) I I Z(13)
X3 = Z(15) Z(9) I Z(11) I Z(13) I I I I X(13)
Z4 = Z(5) Z(15) Z(6) Z(7) Z(9) Z(6) Z(4) Z(8) I I I
Z5 = X(5) X(15) X(6) X(7) X(9) X(6) X(4) X(8) I I I
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5. GENERALIZED FAULT-TOLERANT QUANTUM COMPUTATION OVER
NICE RINGS
In this chapter, generalization of fault-tolerant quantum computation over nice
rings, which was published in [20]1, will be discussed.
Quantum error correcting codes can protect the quantum information system
against errors that are due to the decoherence. However, when building a fault-
tolerant quantum computing device, it is not enough to merely deploy quantum
error correcting codes. A large part of the errors stem from operational errors due
to imperfect gate operations. Furthermore, controlled-not gates likely spread the
errors to other qudits. Unless we take great care, the resulting cascade of errors
will quickly exceed the error-correction capability of the quantum code. Therefore,
it is very important to have a good scheme to avoid such a desperate situation for
constructing the fault-tolerant quantum computing devices.
A simple way for realizing fault-tolerant quantum operations are transversal ope-
rations. A transversal operation acts in a bit-wise fashion, so that the fault-tolerant
gate does not spread errors within the same block of qudits. Thus, it is easily seen
that transversal operations are fault-tolerant. However, one cannot achieve compu-
tational universality with transversal operations alone, as was shown by Eastin and
Knill [14].
Recently, it has been shown that universal fault-tolerant quantum computation is
possible in the binary case with transversal gates and quantum error correction [15].
Using the binary triorthogonal matrix [42], the transversal version of Controlled-
12016 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Sangjun Lee and Andreas Klappenecker, Gene-
ralized fault-tolerant quantum computation over nice rings, 2016 IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory Proceedings (ISIT), July 2016
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Controlled Z (CCZ) operations are indeed logical operations on the binary triort-
hogonal stabilizer codes [15]. In this chapter, we will show how to generalize the
triorthogonal matrix and the triorthogonal stabilizer code over a nice ring [20]. Ba-
sed on these tools, it will be shown that the transversal CCZ operation is the logical
CCZ operation on the triorthogonal stabilizer codes over nice rings.
5.1 Transversal Clifford Operations over Nice Rings
5.1.1 Transversal Fourier Transform
In the d dimensions, where d is a prime, the Hadamard operation is defined as
the d-dimensional discrete Fourier transform [43]
H|x〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
b=0
ωxb|b〉,
where x ∈ Fd and ω = e 2piid . More generally for Fq, where q is a power of a prime,
H|x〉 = 1√
q
q−1∑
b=0
ωtr(xb)|b〉,
where x ∈ Fq, ω = e
2pii
p and tr is the absolute trace of the finite field Fq to its prime
subfield.
With the help of the character, the form can be described more simply. By
substituting the primitive root of the unity ω with the character χ, the Hadamard
operation can be generalized for a nice ring.
Definition 28. Let R be a nice ring. Then, for x ∈ R,
H|x〉 = 1√|R|∑
y∈R
χ(xy)|y〉
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is a Hadamard operation, where χ is a generating irreducible character of the additive
group (R,+), meaning that all other irreducible characters of (R,+) can be expressed
in the form x 7→ χ(ax) for a ∈ R.
The adjoint of the Hadamard operation H† also can be defined as follows.
Definition 29. Let R be a nice ring. Then, for x ∈ R,
H†|x〉 = 1√|R|∑
z∈R
χ(−(zx))|z〉,
where H† is a complex conjugate of transpose Hadamard operation, where χ is the
irreducible character of the additive group (R,+).
We recall the CSS code construction over nice rings as follows.
Proposition 30 ([44]). Let R be a nice ring. Let C1 and C2 denote two clas-
sical linear codes with parameters [n, k1, d1]R and [n, k2, d2]R such that C
⊥
2 ≤ C1.
Then there exists an [[n, k1 + k2 − n, d]]R stabilizer code with minimum distance
d = min{wt(c)|c ∈ (C1 \ C⊥2 ) ∪ (C2 \ C⊥1 )} that is pure to min{d1, d2}.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 9 in [44].
We will call a CSS code self-orthogonal if and only if there exists a classical code
C containing its dual code, C⊥ ⊆ C, such that C1 = C2 = C.
According to [8], given the arbitrary unitary transformation U and the operator
M , UM |ψ〉 = UMU †U |ψ〉. This implies that |ψ〉 is an eigenvector of M if and
only if U |ψ〉 is an eigenvector of the UMU †. When we restrict our attention to the
stabilizer codes, it turned out that the transformed UMU † should be in the stabilizer
S for all M ∈ S [8]. When it comes to the transversal Hadamard operation for the
fault-tolerant quantum computation, we need to check what H⊗nMH†⊗n would be
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for M ∈ S. When you consider CSS quantum codes, the generators of stabilizer
consists of X operators or Z operators. Thus, it would be needed to check if HMH†
is either X or Z for M ∈ {X,Z}.
Using the shift and multiplication operators, we will determine HMH† for M ∈
{X(a), Z(b)}. To simplify computations, we will assume that the nice ring R is
commutative, so ab = ba holds for all a, b ∈ R.
Lemma 31. Let R be a nice ring. For all a, b ∈ R, we have
HX(a)H† = Z(a).
Proof. It suffices to show that HX(a)H† acts on the computational basis {|x〉 | x ∈
R} in the same way as Z(a). Indeed,
HX(a)H†|x〉 =HX(a)
(
1√|R|∑
z∈R
χ(−(zx))|z〉
)
=
1
|R|
∑
z∈R
∑
y∈R
χ(z(−x+ y))χ(ay)|y〉
The character values cancel unless x = y, so we get
HX(a)H†|x〉 = 1|R|
∑
z∈R
χ(ax)|x〉 = χ(ax)|x〉
The latter expression is nothing but Z(a)|x〉. Therefore, we can conclude that
HX(a)H†|x〉 = Z(a)|x〉,
holds for all x ∈ R, which proves the claim.
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Lemma 32. Let R be a nice ring. For a, b ∈ R, we have
HZ(b)H† = X(−b).
In general, X(−b) is not equal to X(b) over a nice ring.
Proof. For all x ∈ R, we have
HZ(b)H†|x〉 =HZ(b)
(
1√|R|∑
z∈R
χ(−(zx))|z〉
)
=
1
|R|
∑
z∈R
∑
y∈R
χ(z(−x+ b+ y))|y〉
The character values cancel unless y = x− b, so we get
HZ(b)H†|x〉 = 1|R|
∑
z∈R
|x− b〉 = |x− b〉.
Since the right-hand side is equal to X(−b)|x〉, the claim follows.
The stabilizer S is the abelian subgroup of the error group En such that the co-
dewords are fixed by all elements of S. For a self-orthogonal CSS code, the stabilizer
has a symmetry, that is, it is possible to have the same set of generators consisting
of X operators by replacing Z’s in the set of generators consisting of Z operators by
X’s or vice versa. From two previous lemmas, we can conclude that applying the
generalized Hadamard operators to the codeword does not change the stabilizer in
the following.
Theorem 33. A self-orthogonal CSS code over a nice ring affords a transversal
Hadamard operation.
Proof. We know that HX(a)H† = Z(a) from Lemma 31 and HZ(b)H† = X(−b)
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from Lemma 32. The first one implies that any generator in the stabilizer consisting
of X operators can be converted to the generator in the stabilizer consisting of Z
operators by a conjugation of the Hadamard operation. When any generator in the
stabilizer consisting of Z operators is converted by the Hadamard conjugation, the
transformed operator is the inverse of a generator in the stabilizer consisting of X
operators since all indices after the transformation are the inverses of the indices
before the transformation and X(b)X(−b) = X(−b)X(b) = I. Since the stabilizer
is a group, there should be an inverse of any elements in S, which means that the
transformed operator is still a generator in S. Therefore, the stabilizer is invariant
under the transversal Hadamard operation.
5.1.2 Transversal SUM Gate
In order to construct the Clifford group, we also need to consider two-qudit ope-
rations, and one of the good candidates is the generalized controlled-NOT operation,
or the SUM gate [43].
Definition 34. Let R be a nice ring. Then, for x, y ∈ R,
SUM |x〉|y〉 = |x〉|y + x〉
is a generalized controlled-NOT operation, or a SUM gate.
The following is the adjoint of the generalized CNOT defined above.
Definition 35. Let R be a ring. Then, for x, y ∈ R,
SUM† |x〉|y〉 = |x〉|y − x〉,
where SUM† is a complex conjugate of transpose SUM gate.
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It is well-known that any self-orthogonal CSS code over a binary field affords a
transversal CNOT, cf. [8]. We will now show that this can be generalized to self-
orthogonal CSS codes over nice rings.
Lemma 36. Let R be a nice ring. For a, b ∈ R, SUM gate maps by a conjugation
X(a)⊗ I → X(a)⊗X(a),
I ⊗X(a) → I ⊗X(a),
Z(b)⊗ I → Z(b)⊗ I,
I ⊗ Z(b) → Z(−b)⊗ Z(b).
Proof. For all elements x, y in R, the SUM gate acts by conjugation on an X gate
in the form
SUM(X(a)⊗ I) SUM† |x〉|y〉 = SUM |x+ a〉|y − x〉
= |x+ a〉|y + a〉
= X(a)|x〉 ⊗X(a)|y〉
and
SUM(I ⊗X(a)) SUM† |x〉|y〉 = SUM |x〉|y − x+ a〉
= |x〉|y + a〉
= |x〉 ⊗X(a)|y〉.
The action of the SUM gate on a Z gate is given by
SUM(Z(b)⊗ I) SUM† |x〉|y〉 = SUMχ(bx)|x〉|y − x〉
= χ(bx)|x〉|y〉
= Z(b)|x〉 ⊗ |y〉
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and
SUM(I ⊗ Z(b)) SUM† |x〉|y〉 = SUMχ(b(y − x))|x〉|y − x〉
= χ(by) · χ(−bx)|x〉|y〉
= Z(−b)|x〉 ⊗ Z(b)|y〉,
which proves the claim.
The above result is similar to the conjugation of the SUM gate in d dimension,
where d is a prime [43]. Thus, applying the transversal SUM gates will work well
fault-tolerantly on CSS codes over nice rings. These operations keep the stabilizer
S × S invariantly.
In a two dimensional quantum system, the Clifford group can be generated by
Hadamard gate, the phase gate, and the controlled-NOT gate. In order to generate
the Clifford group over a nice ring, we may need to have the generalized phase gate.
5.1.3 Transversal Phase Gate
We already know that a multiplication operator Z(b) and a phase gate S com-
mute, that is, Z(b) 7−→S Z(b). When it comes to an addition operator X(a) and a
phase gate S, we want to have the following conjugation action, X(a) 7−→S X(a)Z(a)
or Z(a)X(a). For the finite fields of odd prime, Gottesman [43] showed X 7−→S XZ
using the phase gate defined by |j〉 → ωj(j−1)/2|j〉, and Clark [45] proved X 7−→S ZX
using the phase gate defined by |j〉 → ωj(j+1)/2|j〉. We will extend our scope to a
nice ring R.
To investigate the phase gate over a nice ring, we use Weyl-Heisenberg operators.
The definition of Weyl-Heisenberg operators [46] is
ω(p, q, t) = χ(t)ω(p, q) = χ(t− 2−1pq)Z(p)X(q).
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Since 2 is in general not a unit in a nice ring, we cannot define its inverse 2−1. To
avoid such an issue, we introduce new phase factor χ′(a) = χ(a)1/2, which can be
defined since χ(a) ∈ C. From this new factor, the Weyl-Heisenberg operators are
ω(p, q, t) = χ′(2t− pq)Z(p)X(q) = ω′(p, q, 2t).
Those Weyl operators are closed under multiplication up to phase factors, which is
shown below
ω′(p1, q1, 2t1)ω′(p2, q2, 2t2) = ω′(p1 + p2, q1 + q2, 2t1 + 2t2 + p1q2 − q1p2).
Now, we define the phase gate S by
S|j〉 = χ′(j(j + 1))|j〉,
for all j ∈ R. Then, the phase gate S acts by conjugation on the Weyl operator as
follows.
Lemma 37. Let R be a nice ring. For a, b ∈ R, the phase gate S maps by a
conjugation
Z(b) 7−→ Z(b),
X(a) 7−→ χ′(c)Z(a)X(a),
where c = −a2 + a.
Proof. We will determine the conjugation action of the phase gate S on a Weyl
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operator. For all j, t ∈ R, we have
Sω′(b, a, 2t)|j〉 = χ′(2t− ab)SZ(b)X(a)|j〉
= χ′(2t− a2 + a)Z(a)χ′(−ab)Z(b)X(a)S|j〉
= χ′(2t− a2 + a)ω(a, 0)ω(b, a)S|j〉
= χ′(2t− a2 + a)χ′(a2)ω(a+ b, a)S|j〉
= χ′(2t+ a)ω(a+ b, a)S|j〉
= ω′(a+ b, a, 2t+ a)S|j〉.
By respectively substituting (1, 0) and (0, 1) for (b, a), we obtain the claim.
With the similar definition of the phase gate [45], we can obtain same conjugation
actions with some phase factors over a nice ring R.
The conjugate action of the phase gate onX(a) produces the phase factor χ′(−a2+
a). Thus, given (c1, · · · , cn) ∈ Rn corresponding to the stabilizer generator, the con-
jugating action of the transversal phase gate on this stabilizer generator produces
the phase factor χ′(
∑n
i=1(−c2i +ci)). For the self-orthogonal CSS codes,
∑n
i=1 c
2
i = 0.
This means that applying the transversal phase gate does not change the stabilizer
like the transversal Hadamard operations if the classical codewords corresponding to
the stabilizer generators of the self-orthogonal CSS code satisfy the condition that∑n
i=1 ci = 0. In other words, the transversal phase gate is the logical operation on
the self-orthogonal CSS codes over nice rings when the sum of all entries of each
row in the parity-check matrix of the classical code is zero. For the logical X(a)
and Z(b), it should be satisfied that given (a1, · · · , an) ∈ Rn corresponding to X(a),∑n
i=1(−a2i + ai) = −a2 + a for all a ∈ R. Z(b) and S gate commute, but Z(b) has
the same condition as X(b) does since they have the same entries.
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5.2 Transversal Non-Clifford Operations over Nice Rings
All previous operations belong to the Clifford group, so they cannot provide
a universal set of gates. An example of a non-Clifford operation is given by the
generalized Toffoli gate that we introduce here (which generalizes the Toffoli gates
given in [43] and [7]). If the nice rings is a field, then Nebe, Rains, and Sloane [47]
showed that the Clifford group is a projective maximal finite subgroup of the unitary
group, so adding the Toffoli gate gives a universal set of gates. It seems likely that a
similar result holds for nice rings in general. We will study the controlled-controlled
Z gate from which the generalized Toffoli gate can be obtained by conjugation.
5.2.1 Transversal Controlled-Controlled Z Gates
In order to implement the transversal Controlled-Controlled Z gates over nice
rings, we introduce a triorthogonal matrix defined over a nice ring R, which is a
generalized version of a binary triorthogonal matrix [42].
We define two forms |a · b| : Rn ×Rn → R and |a · b · c| : Rn ×Rn ×Rn → R for
all a, b, c ∈ Rn by
|a · b| =
n∑
i=1
aibi, |a · b · c| =
n∑
i=1
aibici,
where a = (a1, · · · , an), b = (b1, · · · , bn), c = (c1, · · · , cn).
For the transversal CCZ operations to work as the logical CCZ operations on the
encoded triorthogonal stabilizer codes over nice rings, we need to make the triort-
hogonal matrix have stronger restrictions or conditions than those in the definition
provided before. But, it can be easily seen that the new definition of the triorthogo-
nal matrix is still a generalized version of the definition of the binary triorthogonal
matrix.
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Definition 38. Let R be a nice ring. Let G be a m× n matrix with elements in R.
Let g1, · · · , gm are the rows of G. Then, G is triorthogonal if and only if
1. |gi · gj| = 0 for all pairs of rows 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
2. |gi · gi| = 0 or is a unit for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
3. |gi · gj · gk| =

1, if i = j = k and |gi · gi| is a unit,
0, otherwise.
While the binary triorthogonal matrix just had the condition that |gi · gj · gk| = 0
for all distinct triples of rows, the triorthogonal matrix defined above has more
restrictions on triples of rows of the triorthogonal matrix as seen above. For binary
triorthogonal matrix, it is shown that those conditions hold naturally.
For a binary triorthogonal matrix [42], G0 and G1 are denoted by submatrices of
G formed by even-weight and odd-weight rows, respectively. Linear subspaces G0,G1,
and G ⊆ Fn2 are defined as linear subspaces spanned by the rows of G0, G1, and G
respectively.
For a generalized triorthogonal matrix defined above, the submatrices G0 and
G1 are formed by self-orthogonal and non-self-orthogonal rows, respectively. Then,
G0,G1, and G ⊆ Rn are defined as submodules by the rows of G0, G1, and G respecti-
vely. Here, we assume that the first k rows g1, · · · , gk are non-self-orthogonal ones,
and the remainders gk+1, · · · , gm are the self-orthogonal rows.
Lemma 39. Suppose G is triorthogonal over R. Then, (i) G1 is a free submodule of
G, (ii) G0 ∩ G1 = 0, and (iii) G0 = G ∩ G⊥.
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Proof. Let f ∈ G1 such that f =
∑k
i=1 xig
i for xi ∈ R. If f = 0 or f ∈ G0, then
|f ·gi| = xi|gi ·gi| = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since |gi ·gi| is a unit for 1 ≤ i ≤ k by definition,
xi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, which proves (i) and (ii).
We know that f0 · f = 0 for all f0 ∈ G0 and f ∈ G, since rows of G0 are self-
orthogonal and orthogonal to any row of G1 by definition. Thus, G0 ⊆ G ∩ G⊥. Let
f =
∑m
i=1 xig
i ∈ G ∩ G⊥ for xi ∈ R. Then, |f · gi| = xi|gi · gi| = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Since |gi · gi| is a unit, xi is 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Thus, f ∈ G0. This proves (iii).
We define a CSS code (X,G0;Z,G⊥) with X-type stabilizers X(f) for f ∈ G0,
and Z-type stabilizers Z(g) for g ∈ G⊥.
Lemma 40. Let R be a commutative nice ring. The CSS code (X,G0;Z,G⊥) has k
logical qudits, and its logical X and Z operators can be chosen as
Xi(s) = X(s · gi), Zi(t) = Z(t · gi),
where g1, · · · , gk are the rows of G1, and s, t are in R.
Proof. Since Xi(s) Zj(t) = χ(st|gi · gj|)Zj(t) Xi(s), logical X and Z operators com-
mute if i 6= j, and does not commute if i = j. This means that those logical operators
obey the commutation rules.
We also need to show that the logical X and Z operators commute with all stabi-
lizers. Given Z-type stabilizer Z(g) for g ∈ G⊥, X(s · gi)Z(g) = χ(s|gi · g|)Z(g)X(s ·
gi) = Z(g)X(s · gi) since gi ∈ G1 ⊆ G and g ∈ G⊥. Given X-type stabilizer X(f) for
f ∈ G0, Z(t · gi)X(f) = χ(t|gi · f |)X(f)Z(t · gi) = X(f)Z(t · gi) since gi ∈ G1 ⊆ G
and f ∈ G0 = G ∩ G⊥ from Lemma 39
Since Z(g)|f〉 = χ(gf)|f〉 = |f〉 for any f ∈ G0 and any g ∈ G + G⊥, the encoded
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state |0⊗k〉 is defined as
|0⊗k〉 = |G0〉 = 1√|G0|
∑
g∈G0
|g〉.
For any x = (x1, · · · , xk) ∈ Rk, the encoded state |x〉 is obtained by
|x〉 = X1(x1) · · ·Xk(xk)|G0〉
=
1√|G0|
∑
f∈G0+x1g1+···+xkgk
|f〉.
In [15], transversal CCZ operations are implemented on the triorthogonal sta-
bilizer codes over F2. Now, we will try to show the generalized transversal CCZ
operations on the triorthogonal stabilizer codes over nice rings. It was shown that
HZ(b)H† = X(−b), so that the transversal generalized Toffoli gate can be imple-
mented if the transversal generalized CCZ operation is implemented. We assume
that the triorthogonal stabilizer code to be considered has a single encoded qudit
with a non-self-orthogonal row g1 for simplicity. Let Gx = G0 + x · g1. Then, for
x ∈ R, |x〉 = 1√|Gx|
∑
g∈Gx |g〉.
CCZ(b)⊗n|x, y, z〉 =
∑
l∈Gx,m∈Gy ,n∈Gz
CCZ(b)⊗n|l,m, n〉
=
∑
l∈Gx,m∈Gy ,n∈Gz
χ(b|l ·m · n|)|l,m, n〉
In order to check if it is possible to implement the transversal generalized CCZ
operations on the triorthogonal stabilizer codes, we need to calculate the value of
|l ·m · n|.
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|l ·m · n| = |(l′ + xg1) · (m′ + yg1) · (n′ + zg1)|,
for l′,m′, n′ ∈ G0. By definition, the only term that does not vanish is |g1 · g1 · g1|.
So, |l ·m · n| = xyz|g1 · g1 · g1| = xyz.
Therefore, the transversal CCZ operation is the logical CCZ operation on the
triorthogonal stabilizer codes as follows.
CCZ(b)⊗n|x, y, z〉 = χ(bxyz)|x, y, z〉
Using the transversal Fourier transform with a help of the quantum error correcting
code, we can construct the transversal Toffoli gate working on the triorthogonal
stabilizer codes [15].
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6. OPTIMAL KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS FOR UNCONDITIONALLY
SECURE KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Finally, optimal key exchange protocols will be discussed for unconditionally se-
cure key distribution schemes1.
The key exchange protocols by Bennett and Brassard [21], Ekert [22], and Kish [23]
offer unconditional security for establishing a common secret between two parties.
The common secret allows the two parties to establish a shared key. These three
protocols achieve their remarkable feat by resting their security on physical principles
rather than on computational ones. However, all three protocols assume a dedicated
communication channel between the two parties, which can be impractical when the
number of parties grows. In practice, a communication network will connect the
different parties. Therefore, it is natural to ask how quickly a group of people can es-
tablish shared secrets between any two parties of the group using the unconditionally
secure point-to-point key exchange protocols [21], [22] or [23] over a communication
network? Naturally, the answer to this question depends on the topology of the
network and the number of key exchanges that can be done in parallel by a party.
Gonzalez, Balog, and Kish [48] started to investigate this question and gave
asymptotic results for daisy chain, fully connected, and star network topologies. We
will improve upon their results and furthermore give optimal or near optimal result
for arbitrary network topologies.
1This chapter contains the unpublished paper “Optimal Key Exchange Protocols for Uncondi-
tionally Secure Key Distribution Schemes” by S. Lee and A. Klappenecker [24].
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6.1 Switched Star Networks
Suppose that m parties communicate over a star network. Each of the partici-
pants is connected to a central crossbar switch. If parties a and b are exchanging a
key, then no one else can exchange a key with either a or b at the same time, but
other pairs in {1, 2, . . . ,m} \ {a, b} can do a key exchange in parallel.
1
2
3
4
0
S
Figure 6.1: A star network connecting 5 participants to one central crossbar switch S.
Two key exchanges can be done in parallel per round, but not more. A total of five rounds
are needed so that all 5 participants can exchange keys.
A round consists of key exchanges that can be done in parallel (e.g. in a star
network with five nodes, we could have the following key exchanges in parallel {1, 2}
and {3, 4}, but 0 would have to sit out this round). The next theorem shows that m
parties can exchange all keys over a star network in m rounds when m is odd, and
in m− 1 rounds when m is even.
Theorem 41. Suppose that m nodes are connected by a star network, where m is
an integer greater than 1. Then 2
⌊
m−1
2
⌋
+ 1 rounds of point-to-point key exchanges
(using the protocols [21] or [23]) are necessary and sufficient to exchange all
(
m
2
)
pairs of keys among the m nodes.
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The proof of this theorem will follow from Proposition 43 for the case m even
and Proposition 44 for the case m odd. We will first need to prove a simple lemma.
Lemma 42. Let G be an abelian group of order 2n − 1. Then f : G → G given by
f(x) = 2x is an injective function.
Proof. If g and h are elements of G such that 2g = 2h, then
g = g + (2n− 1)g = n(2g) = n(2h) = h+ (2h− 1)h = h,
so the function f is injective, as claimed.
Proposition 43. Suppose that m = 2n nodes are connected by a star network. Then
it is possible to establish
(
2n
2
)
pairwise key-exchanges in 2n − 1 rounds. No protocol
can establish this in fewer rounds.
Proof. Let us label the 2n nodes of the network by the elements of an abelian group
G of order 2n − 1 and an additional element ∞ that is not contained in G. In a
single round, each node can establish a key exchange with exactly one other node.
It is allowed that disjoint pairs of nodes can exchange their keys in parallel, so at
most n pairs of nodes can exchange a key in one round.
We will parameterize the round by an element of the group G. A round with
parameter g ∈ G consists of the following pairs of key exchanges:
Γg = {{∞, g}} ∪ {{h, k} ∈ G×G | h+ k = 2g, h 6= k}.
An element h ∈ G is paired with the element k = 2g− h. We have h = k if and only
if 2g = 2h. In an abelian group of odd order, 2g = 2h implies that g = h by the
previous lemma. Therefore, Γg contains n sets of pairs.
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If g and g′ are two distinct elements of G, then Γg ∩ Γg′ = ∅. Seeking a contra-
diction, let us assume that there exists a pair {h, k} that is contained in both Γg
and Γg′ . The pair {h, k} cannot contain ∞, so both h and k must be elements of
G. Since {h, k} is contained in both sets, we must have 2g = 2g′, whence g = g′,
contradicting the fact that the elements g and g′ are distinct.
Therefore, ⋃
g∈G
Γg
contains n(2n − 1) = (2n
2
)
distinct pairs of nodes. We can conclude that after
executing the 2n − 1 rounds Γg with g ∈ G, we have established a key exchange
between any pair of the 2n nodes. Since each round permits at most n key exchanges,
we cannot have fewer rounds to exchange
(
2n
2
)
keys, so the protocol is optimal.
Proposition 44. Suppose that m = 2n − 1 nodes are connected by a star network.
Then it is possible to establish
(
2n−1
2
)
pairwise key-exchanges in 2n − 1 rounds. No
protocol can establish this in fewer rounds.
Proof. Let us label the 2n − 1 nodes of the network by the elements of an abelian
group G of order 2n− 1. In a single round, each node can establish a key exchange
with exactly one other node. It is allowed that disjoint pairs of nodes can exchange
their keys in parallel, so at most n − 1 pairs of nodes can exchange a key in one
round.
We will parameterize the round by an element of the group G. A round with
parameter g ∈ G consists of the following pairs of key exchanges:
∆g = {{h, k} ∈ G×G | h+ k = 2g, h 6= k}.
An element h ∈ G is paired with the element k = 2g− h. We have h = k if and only
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if 2g = 2h. In an abelian group of odd order, 2g = 2h implies that g = h by the
previous lemma. Therefore, ∆g contains n− 1 sets of pairs.
If g and g′ are two distinct elements of G, then ∆g ∩∆g′ = ∅, since ∆g ⊂ Γg and
∆g′ ⊂ Γg′ and Γg ∩ Γg′ = ∅, using the notation of the proof of the previous theorem.
Therefore, ⋃
g∈G
∆g
contains (n−1)(2n−1) = (2n−1
2
)
distinct pairs of nodes. We can conclude that after
executing the 2n − 1 rounds ∆g with g ∈ G, we have established a key exchange
between any pair of the 2n − 1 nodes. Since each round permits at most n − 1 key
exchanges, we cannot have fewer rounds to exchange
(
2n−1
2
)
keys, so the protocol is
optimal.
Example 45. Consider a star network with 5 participants. According to the previous
proposition, we will need at least five rounds to exchange the keys among all partici-
pants. The proof details a way to accomplish these key changes. They are explicitly
given by the following rounds of key exchanges:
∆0 = {{1, 4}, {2, 3}},
∆1 = {{0, 2}, {3, 4}},
∆2 = {{0, 4}, {1, 3}},
∆3 = {{0, 1}, {2, 4}},
∆4 = {{0, 3}, {1, 2}},
where we have used the cyclic group G = Z/5Z with addition modulo 5.
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6.2 General Network Topologies
In the previous section, we worked out the key exchange protocol for the star
network. Since every participant can exchange a key with every other participant,
the underlying communication structure can be represented by a complete graph.
However, one limitation of the star network is that each participant can exchange at
most one key per round.
In this section, we will discuss a much more general setup. We assume that a
participant p has several ports that allow her to exchange keys with up to m(p) other
participants in parallel per round. The number m(p) of communication ports is a
positive integer that can vary depending on the participant p. For instance, a parti-
cipant p1 may have m(p1) = 3 different communication ports, whereas participant p2
may have just m(p2) = 2 communication ports. A larger number of ports increases
the cost, but may reduce the number of rounds until all keys are exchanged.
In general, we might not need to secure communication between all parties of a
communication network. The key exchange multigraph models each participant by
a node and contains an edge between two nodes if and only if the participants are
going to exchange keys. We even allow several edges between nodes, so that we can
also model the parallel exchange of several keys between two participants in a single
round. Every finite multigraph can occur as a key exchange multigraph, but we
assume that the multigraph does not contain loops, since no one needs to exchange
a key with herself.
It is instructive to look at some small examples. Figure 6.2 shows a network with
three participants that are connected with multiple edges.
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4 3
3
1
1
1
1 2
2
Figure 6.2: A key exchange multigraph for three participants. The vertices are labeled
with the number of ports. Each edge is labeled with the round in which the key exchange
is performed. Two rounds of key exchanges are needed, since one node v is of degree 4,
but has only 3 ports. Therefore, dd(v)/m(v)e = d4/3e = 2 rounds are needed by any key
exchange protocol. The given two-round key exchange protocol is optimal.
We can contrast this with the key exchange protocol for three participants shown
in Figure 6.3.
1 1
1
1
2 3
Figure 6.3: A key exchange multigraph for three participants. Each participant has a
single communication port and can exchange just a single key per round. In this configu-
ration, it is not possible to exchange more than one key per round overall, so three rounds
are needed. This three-round key exchange protocol is optimal as well.
Let us fix some notation. Let G = (V,E) be a multigraph with vertex set V and
edge set E. Let (
V
2
)
= {{x, y} | x, y ∈ V, x 6= y}
be the set of unordered pairs in V . We chose to represent each edge by a unique
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identifier e in the set of edges E. We denote by b : E → (V
2
)
the map that associates
to the edge the pair of incident vertices. In other words, b(e) = {u, v} means that
the edge e is incident to the vertices u and v.
Let µ(u, v) be the number of edges between the nodes u and v, that is,
µ(u, v) = |{e ∈ E | b(e) = {u, v}}|.
We denote by N(v) the neighborhood of the node v, that is, the set of all nodes in
V that are connected by some edge to v. We write µ(u) for the maximal multiplicity
of any edge incident with the vertex u; thus,
µ(u) = max{µ(u, v) | v ∈ N(u)}.
The number of edges that are incident with a vertex v is called the degree d(v)
of the vertex. We denote the maximal degree of the graph G = (V,E) by ∆(G). In
other words, ∆(G) = max{d(v) | v ∈ V }.
Let Rm(G) denote the minimal number of rounds needed to exchange all keys
between any parties that are connected by an edge in the multigraph G.
Theorem 46. Let G = (V,E) denote the key exchange multigraph, and let m : V →
N∗ be the function assigning the number of communicator ports to each vertex. Then
the minimal number R(G,m) of rounds that any protocol needs to exchange keys
between all parties that are connected by an edge in G satisfies
max
v∈V
⌈
d(v)
m(v)
⌉
≤ R(G,m) ≤ max
v∈V
⌈
d(v) + µ(v)
m(v)
⌉
.
If µ(v) ≤ m(v), then the lower and upper bounds on R(G,m) differ by at most 1.
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Proof. Let C : E → N∗ denote a function that assigns a positive integer to each
edge. For an edge e in E, the number C(e) denotes the round during which a key
exchange between the vertices u and v is performed, where {u, v} = b(e). Thus, the
assignment of rounds is an edge coloring problem of sorts.
Not all possible colorings C will lead to a feasible key exchange schedule. One
serious restriction is that a node v can perform at most m(v) key exchanges per
round. Let ni(v) denote the number of edges e of color i that are incident with v,
that is,
ni(v) = |{e ∈ E | C(e) = i, v ∈ b(e)}|.
We call C a proper m-coloring for the multigraph G if and only if for each vertex v
in V and each color i, we have ni(v) ≤ m(v). A coloring C provides a feasible key
exchange schedule if and only if it is a proper m-coloring.
We are interested in the minimal number of rounds R(G,m) of any key exchange
protocol for the key exchange multigraph G. In terms of coloring, this means that
we want to find the smallest integer k such that there exist a proper m-coloring with
k colors, but no such coloring exists with fewer colors. In other words, the minimal
number of rounds R(G,m) in a key exchange protocol for G and the fewest possible
colors k of a proper m-coloring of G coincide.
By the generalized pigeonhole principle, if d(v) edges are incident to a vertex v,
and the node v has m(v) communication ports, then at least dd(v)/m(v)e rounds
of key exchanges are needed before v is able to complete the key exchanges with all
its d(v) neighbors. Therefore, the minimal number R(G,m) of key exchange rounds
satisfies
max
v∈V
⌈
d(v)
m(v)
⌉
≤ R(G,m).
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It was shown in [49, Theorem 3] that
k = max
v∈V
⌈
d(v) + µ(v)
m(v)
⌉
colors suffice to give the multigraph G a proper m-coloring. Therefore,
R(G,m) ≤ max
v∈V
⌈
d(v) + µ(v)
m(v)
⌉
.
If the number of ports is equal to 1 for all vertices v, then this is know as Vizing’s
theorem. The bound ensures that km(v) ≥ d(v) + µ(v), so at each node there are
always µ(v) colors available when coloring with k colors. The proof given in [49,
Theorem 3] shows that this gives enough freedom to ensure the existence of a proper
m-coloring with k colors.
Let us consider some examples. Let us denote by Cn the cycle graph on n vertices.
Each vertex of the cycle graph is of degree 2. A cycle graph has n edges.
Figure 6.4: The cycle graphs with 5 and 6 vertices.
The next proposition determines the minimal number of key exchange rounds
that are needed in the cycle network for all possible configurations of ports.
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Proposition 47. Consider a network of n nodes that form a cycle graph Cn, so each
node performs a key exchange with precisely two neighbors. Then the minimal number
R(Cn,m) of key exchange rounds for a given configuration m of communication ports
is given as follows.
(i) If n is even and m(v) = 1 for some vertex v, then R(Cn,m) = 2.
(ii) If n is odd and m(v) = 1 for all vertices v, then R(Cn,m) = 3.
(iii) If n is odd and m(v) = 1 for some vertex v and m(u) ≥ 2 for some other vertex
u, then R(G,m) = 2.
(iv) If m(v) ≥ 2 for all vertices v, then R(Cn,m) = 1.
Note that the cases (i) and (iv) cover all situations for cycle graphs with an even
number of vertices, and (ii)–(iv) cover all situations for cycle graphs with an odd
number of vertices.
Proof. (i) If n is even, then coloring the edges of Cn by alternating the colors 1 and
2 yields a proper m-coloring for any m, so R(G,m) ≤ 2. If m(v) = 1 for some
vertex v, then R(G,m) ≥ dd(v)/m(v)e = d2/1e = 2. Therefore, the minimal
number of key exchange rounds is R(G,m) = 2.
(ii) If n is odd and m(v) = 1 for all vertices v, then two colors do not suffice.
Indeed, each vertex has degree 2, so at least two colors are needed, but the
edges would have to alternate in the two colors, which is impossible for an odd
number of edges.
(iii) Suppose that n is odd, m(v) = 1 for some vertex v, and m(u) = 2 for another.
We need at least dd(v)/m(v)e = d2/1e = 2 colors. However, two colors suffice.
Indeed, we can color the edges incident with u in the color 1, and alternate
the color for the remaining n− 2 edges (starting and ending with the color 2).
Thus, we can conclude that R(G,m) = 2.
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(iv) If m(v) is at least two for each vertex v, then coloring each edge with the color
1 is a valid edge m-coloring, so R(G,m) = 1.
6.3 Pass-Through Networks
In this section, we make a small but very significant change to our network model
by allowing that communication can pass through nodes. This is best explained
with a small example. Consider the linear chain network with four nodes shown in
Figure 6.5.
1 2 2 1
Figure 6.5: Linear chain network with four nodes. The two middle nodes have two
communication ports, and the nodes at the ends have just one communication port each.
The obvious drawback of the linear chain network is that only neighboring nodes
can establish a key exchange, but the two nodes at the end cannot exchange a key.
Let us now assume that a node in the middle can either exchange key with its
two neighbors or pass-through the communication and allow neighboring nodes to
exchange keys, see Figures 6.6 and 6.7.
1 2 2 1
Figure 6.6: Linear chain network with four nodes. The second node from the left is in
pass-through mode, so that the first and third nodes can exchange keys.
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1 2 2 1
Figure 6.7: Linear chain network with four nodes. Both nodes in the middle are in
pass-through mode, so that the first and fourth nodes can exchange keys.
We can now ask the question: How many rounds of key exchanges does it take so
that all pairs of nodes in a linear chain network have exchanged keys assuming that
pass-through is allowed?
The interesting aspect of this setup is that a simple network structure, such as the
linear chain network, can still provide the connectivity of a complete graph. However,
the scheduling of the key exchanges is now complicated by the fact that two or more
communication links might be involved for key exchanges between non-neighboring
nodes.
We will use a hypergraph rather than a graph to model the key exchanges. The
hypergraph allows us to model each communication port as a node, so that we can
include in a hyperedge all communication ports that are involved in (or disabled by)
a key exchange.
For simplicity, let us assume that we are given a linear chain network with n nodes.
The node 1 has a single communication port v1,r that connects him to nodes to the
right. Each node k in the range 1 < k < n has two communication ports, vk,l that
allows to communicate with nodes less than k, and vk,r that allows to communicate
with nodes greater than k. Finally, the node n has a single communication port vn,l.
We can model the linear chain network by a hypergraph as follows. The set of
vertices Vn consists of the communication ports
Vn = {v1,r, v2,l, v2,r, . . . , vn−1,l, vn−1,r, vn,l}.
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The key exchange between nodes i and j for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n is modeled by the
hyperedge eij that contains the communication port vi,r of the node i and the com-
munication port vj,l of the node j, and the communication ports vk,l and vk,r of all
nodes k in the range i < k < j that are disabled due to pass-through, hence
eij = {vi,r, vi+1,l, vi+1,r, . . . , vj−1,l, vj−1,r, vj,l}.
Thus, the hypergraph Hn = (Vn, En) modeling the key exchanges for the linear
chain network with pass-through has 2n − 2 vertices and a set of (n
2
)
hyperedges
En = {eij | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}.
Example 48. The linear chain network with four nodes has six communication ports
V4 = {v1,r, v2,l, v2,r, v3,l, v3,r, v4,l}.
and six hyperedges eij that model the key exchange between the nodes i and j, namely
e12 = {v1,r, v2,l}, e13 = {v1,r, v2,l, v2,r, v3,l},
e14 = {v1,r, v2,l, v2,r, v3,l, v3,r, v4,l}, e23 = {v2,r, v3,l},
e24 = {v2,r, v3,l, v3,r, v4,l}, e34 = {v3,r, v4,l}.
The key exchange between nodes i and j requires two ports for communication and
disabling of 2(j − i+ 1) intermediate ports due to pass-through.
Our goal is to find the optimal number of rounds for key exchanges over the
linear chain network with n hosts. This means that we need to find a coloring of the
hyperedges of Hn with a minimal number of colors such that any two hyperedges
that have a vertex in common receive different colors; in other words, we need to
find the chromatic index of Hn.
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Since we prefer to work with a graph rather than a hypergraph, we translate
the edge coloring problem of the hypergraph Hn into an equivalent vertex coloring
problem of the line graph L(Hn). We can form the line graph L(Hn) = (V
′
n, E
′
n)
of the hypergraph Hn as follows. The set of vertices V
′
n of the line graph L(Hn) is
given by the set of hyperedges V ′n = En of the hypergraph Hn, and the edge set E
′
n
contains a pair {ei,j, ek,l} of hyperedges of Hn if and only if ei,j ∩ ek,l 6= ∅.
The smallest number of colors needed to color the vertices of L(Hn) such that
adjacent vertices do not share the same color is called the chromatic number of line
graph L(Hn). Since the line graph exchanges the role of hyperedges and vertices,
the chromatic index of the hypergraph Hn is the same as the chromatic number of
the line graph L(Hn). Therefore, the problem of finding the minimal number of
rounds in key exchanges in the line graph when pass-through is allowed is the same
as finding the chromatic number of the line graph L(Hn).
It might be instructive to look at an example.
Example 49. We discussed the hypergraph H4 in Example 48. The line graph of H4
is shown in Figure 6.8. Every node of the line graph L(H4) represents a hyperedge.
Two nodes of the line graph are adjacent if and only if the corresponding hyperedges
share a vertex. Since the line graph contains a clique with four nodes, we need at
least four rounds to exchange all keys. It turns out that four rounds are enough, since
we can exchange keys in round 1 between nodes {1, 4}, in round 2 between {1, 3} and
{3, 4}, in round 3 between {1, 2} and {2, 4}, and in round 4 between {2, 3}.
The next theorem determines the number of key exchange rounds in the linear
chain network with n nodes by deriving the chromatic number of the line graph
L(Hn).
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e1,4
e1,3 e2,4
e1,2 e2,3 e3,4
Figure 6.8: The line graph L(H4) of the hypergraph H4 representing the linear chain
network with 4 hosts. Since we have a clique with four nodes in L(H4), this means that
every vertex coloring of L(H4) needs at least four colors.
Theorem 50. The minimal number Rn of key exchange rounds in the linear chain
network with n participants with key exchanges between all participants is given by
Rn =

n2
4
if n is even,
n2−1
4
if n is odd.
Proof. We set k = bn/2c, so that n = 2k when n is even and n = 2k + 1 when n is
odd. Let us partition the set V ′n = En of vertices of the line graph L(Hn) into the
sets
An = {eij | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k},
Cn = {eij | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, k + 1 ≤ j ≤ n},
Bn = {eij | k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
The sets An, Bn, and Cn are pairwise disjoint, and their union is the entire set
V ′n = En.
Since each element eij in the set Cn contains vk,r, we can conclude that Cn is a
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clique in the line graph L(Hn) with m elements, where
m =

k2 = n
2
4
if n is even,
k(k + 1) = n
2−1
4
if n is odd.
Therefore, each vertex coloring of L(Hn) requires at least m different colors.
We can give a vertex coloring C of L(Hn) with m colors as follows.
(a) For eij in Cn, we set C(eij) = k(j − k − 1) + i.
(b) For eij in An, we have ej,n−i+1 in Cn and we set C(eij) = C(ej,n−i+1).
(c) For eij in Bn, we have en−j+1,i in Cn and we set C(eij) = C(en−j+1,i).
In this coloring, the m vertices in Cn have pairwise distinct colors.
We will now show that C is a proper coloring of the vertices. For eij ∈ An,
the set {eij, ej,n−i+1} is an independent set in L(Hn). Similarly, for eij ∈ Bn, the
set {en−j+1,i, eij} is an independent set in L(Hn). Since vertices in an independent
set can be colored with the same color, we only need to show that each element
in An ∪ Bn receives a different color when assigning colors as in (b) and (c), so no
coloring conflicts can arise.
The map τ : An → Cn given by τ(eij) = ej,n−i+1 is an injective map. The map
σ : Bn → Cn given by σ(eij) = en−j+1,i is an injective map as well. The two maps have
disjoint images in Cn, since any eij in An yields an image τ(eij) = ej,n−i+1 satisfying
j+n−i+1 ≥ n+2, whereas any eij in Bn yields an image σ(eij) = en−j+1,i satisfying
n− j + 1 + i ≤ n. Therefore, the map ρ : An ∪Bn → Cn given by
ρ(eij) =

τ(eij) = ej,n−i+1 if eij ∈ An,
σ(eij) = en−j+1,i if eij ∈ Bn,
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is injective as well. Since all elements in An ∪ Bn get assigned different colors, no
coloring conflicts will arise. The color assignments in (b) and (c) are proper, since
elements in An ∪ Bn get the same color as elements in Cn only when they form an
independent set.
Remark 51. Gonzalez, Kish, Balog, and Enjeti have shown in [50] that the number
of rounds for key exchanges for the linear chain network with pass-through is at most
(N + 1)2/4 when N is odd and ((N + 1)2 − 1)/4 when N is even, where N = n− 1.
The previous theorem proves that their key exchange protocol is optimal. Our protocol
given here differs from the one given in [50].
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7. CONCLUSIONS
As nice nearrings and its special subclass, nice rings, were introduced in [16],
we can construct quantum error correcting codes without the restriction that their
alphabet sizes are powers of a prime. In this thesis, two quantum error correcting
schemes were generalized over nice rings.
The first quantum code we showed to generalize was the subsystem code. We gave
a construction of subsystem codes over nice nearrings generally. Then, by focusing
our scope on nice rings, we derived a construction of subsystem codes from classical
linear codes over finite Frobenius rings. Furthermore, for the much smaller class of
free subsystem codes over finite chain rings, we were able to show that there exists
a free subsystem code over a finite field that has the same rate and at least same
minimum distance.
For the generalization of the entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting co-
des, we first showed that the R-module can be decomposed as an orthogonal direct
sum of hyperbolic pairs since it is a finite symplectic abelian group with the anti-
symmetric bicharacter. From that, it can be possible to have a symplectic basis and
a isotropic basis generating a free submodule of R2n. It was shown that appending
appropriate entanglement qudits, the noncommuting generators are extended to the
commuting generators. The entanglement-assisted quantum error correcting codes
over nice rings can be constructed with the extended commuting generators.
When it comes to the generalization of the fault-tolerant quantum computation,
we showed that transversal versions of Fourier transform, SUM gate, and phase gate
are logical operations on CSS codes over nice rings. For non-Clifford operation,
we discussed that the transversal CCZ gate can be performed fault-tolerantly on
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triorthogonal stabilizer codes over nice rings. Using these transversal Clifford and
non-Clifford gates, quantum computation over nice rings can be fault-tolerant and
universal.
Finally, the optimal key exchange protocols on three network topologies, the star
network topology, the general network topology, and the pass-through network topo-
logy, were discussed for unconditionally secure key distribution. For the star network,
we can compute the optimal number of rounds needed for the key exchanges between
all pairs of given nodes. In order to expand our scope to the more general situation,
the multigraph was investigated as the key exchange model, and based on this set-
ting, the quite tight bounds on the minimum number of rounds required for the
key exchange were shown. For the pass-through network topology, the hypergraph
was introduced to model the network, and its line graph was derived and used to
calculate the optimal number of rounds for the key exchange.
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